<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Blue Laboratories]]></title><description><![CDATA[Exploring the policies being proposed, debated, enacted, and implemented across America's Democratic-led states,]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 17:41:37 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.blue-laboratories.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Jordan]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[bluelaboratories@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[bluelaboratories@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Jordan]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Jordan]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[bluelaboratories@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[bluelaboratories@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Jordan]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[FICO Won't Say What Your Credit Score Costs Anymore. Democrats Can Find Out.]]></title><description><![CDATA[FICO had its best year ever, then stopped publishing its prices. A Republican attorney general is already using state antitrust law to investigate. Democrats have the same tools - they should use them]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/fico-wont-say-what-your-credit-score</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/fico-wont-say-what-your-credit-score</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 16:03:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RFAI!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5fb28aea-6d53-4bf7-bd50-4754a418c60f_1280x1280.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>Big Picture</strong></h2><p>On November 4, Fair Isaac Corporation, the company behind the FICO Score, told investors it had just closed &#8220;the most successful financial year in FICO&#8217;s history.&#8221; Revenue hit $2.53 billion, up 27%. Net income rose to $835 million, from $652 million a year earlier. The Scores segment, which sells the credit scores lenders use to decide who gets a mortgage, grew about 41%, to $1.65 billion.</p><p>On the very same call, CEO Will Lansing said FICO would now stop telling anyone what it charges for those scores.</p><p>The company that prices the number standing between a family and a home loan has decided that price is now private. Republicans have been taking action on this matter.  The question now is: after the results of the mid-terms, what can and should newly empowered Democrats do at the state and federal levels to address this kitchen table affordability issue and show voters they are serious about improving their lives and taking on the challenges they face?</p><h2><strong>&#8220;We&#8217;re not going to answer that&#8221;</strong></h2><p>Asked about pricing for next year, Lansing said FICO had concluded that being open about its prices wasn&#8217;t worth it:</p><p><em>&#8220;[I]nternally, we&#8217;ve had a lot of conversations about, has this transparency been helpful? The conclusion is no, it has not been helpful. &#8230; So, on a go-forward basis, our intention is to not share every detail. We&#8217;re not going to share every pricing program. We&#8217;re not going to share what the prices are. We&#8217;re not going to share all of the terms.&#8221;</em></p><p>Pressed on whether the average price of a FICO Score would go up, down, or sideways, he said: <strong>&#8220;We&#8217;re not going to answer that.&#8221;</strong> He also complained that FICO &#8220;has become the poster child for affordability in housing, which is just a crazy thing.&#8221;</p><p>FICO is now moving to &#8220;custom&#8221; mortgage pricing negotiated lender by lender, including a new &#8220;FICO Preferred&#8221; program. It also declined to give investors any guidance for fiscal 2027. Neither homebuyers nor shareholders will be told what FICO plans to charge next year.</p><h2><strong>How the price got here</strong></h2><p>FICO argues its score is a small piece of a home loan&#8217;s cost. Lansing said on the call that it &#8220;was such a tiny fraction of overall closing costs.&#8221; The problem is how fast that piece has grown:</p><ul><li><p><strong>Until 2023:</strong> about 60 cents per mortgage score.</p></li><li><p><strong>2023:</strong> tiered wholesale pricing from $0.60 to $2.75 per score.</p></li><li><p><strong>2025:</strong> $4.95 per score, up 41% from $3.50.</p></li><li><p><strong>2026:</strong> $10 per score for the same product, or $4.95 plus a $33 fee per borrower when the loan closes.</p></li></ul><p>Most mortgages require a score from each of the three credit bureaus, so lenders pay three times per borrower. The Community Home Lenders of America calculates that FICO&#8217;s base price for that three-score is report went from $1.80 in late 2022 to $30 in 2026. Lenders now report paying more than $500 per loan for credit reports, up from $50 to $100 in 2022. Borrowers pay those costs in closing costs and fees, whether or not the loan ever closes.</p><p>The increases are what&#8217;s driving FICO&#8217;s record year. Its earnings release credits higher mortgage score prices for its growth even as fewer mortgages were written.</p><p>Up to now, those increases were at least public. That&#8217;s how lenders, reporters, and lawmakers tracked them. Once each lender negotiates a confidential deal, there is no published number to point to. The way to get the numbers back is through someone with subpoena power.</p><h2><strong>Florida went first</strong></h2><p>On July 1, Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier, a Republican, issued a civil investigative demand to FICO under the Florida Antitrust Act. A civil investigative demand works like a subpoena. It requires FICO to hand over records on its pricing, its licensing contracts with the credit bureaus, its internal market-share analyses, and its communications about competitors. &#8220;Floridians deserve fair access to credit&#8212;not a system controlled by one company that repeatedly jacks up prices and blocks competition,&#8221; Uthmeier said.</p><p>That is the information Lansing just said FICO won&#8217;t share. A state attorney general can require FICO to produce it.</p><p>Florida isn&#8217;t alone on the right. At the federal level, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) opened a Senate investigation in March and urged the FTC to open its own. FHFA Director Bill Pulte has opened Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans to VantageScore 4.0, a rival score owned by the three bureaus. &#8220;FICO has enjoyed a monopoly. No more,&#8221; he wrote.</p><h2><strong>Where are the Democrats?</strong></h2><p>Democrats had an early jump on the issue, but have not taken subsequent action.</p><p> In October 2024, 34 Democratic senators and representatives, led by Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Rep. Jamaal Bowman, urged President Biden to have the Justice Department investigate whether FICO was violating antitrust law. That same month, the Community Home Lenders of America asked Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul to consider his own antitrust inquiry.</p><p>Since then, the action has moved to Republican officeholders.</p><p>The groundwork already exists. A consolidated private antitrust case against FICO has been running in federal court in Chicago since 2020. In 2024, the judge dismissed the claims against the credit bureaus but let a monopolization claim against FICO proceed, along with related state-law claims. The case is now in discovery.</p><p>Not to mention the demand for Congressional action on housing affordability, something Democrats taking over gavels in Congress should be ready to lead on.</p><h2><strong>What Democrats could do</strong></h2><p>At the state level</p><ol><li><p><strong>Issue their own civil investigative demands.</strong> Most states have antitrust and consumer protection laws with subpoena-style powers. Florida&#8217;s demand is a ready template.</p></li><li><p><strong>Weigh in on the Illinois case.</strong> States can file amicus briefs or coordinate with private plaintiffs. Attorney General Raoul&#8217;s office already has the CHLA&#8217;s request on file.</p></li><li><p><strong>Push for disclosure.</strong> Legislatures could look at requiring lenders to show borrowers what they paid for credit scores and reports. Any such law would have to be drafted around federal preemption under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.</p></li><li><p><strong>Use state housing finance agencies.</strong> These agencies run or sponsor large first-time-buyer programs. They could track what their borrowers pay for credit reports and, where loans are sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, look at whether VantageScore 4.0 lowers those costs.</p></li></ol><p>At the federal level:</p><ol><li><p><strong>Oversight</strong>: Issue Congressional oversight letters of inquiry or lead a Congressional hearing that will shed light on FICO&#8217;s pricing practices and models, including requiring CEO testimony.</p></li><li><p><strong>Demand a DOJ or FTC Investigation</strong>: Using Senators Warren and Hawley&#8217;s templates, urge the Trump administration to investigate FICO&#8217;s monopolistic practices. FICO&#8217;s side</p></li></ol><p>FICO says its score is enormously valuable relative to its price. It also says much of what borrowers pay goes to the credit bureaus&#8217; markups, not to FICO, and that its direct-licensing and Preferred programs are meant to bring those markups down. The bureaus do share the blame for rising credit report costs, and Pulte has said they have been &#8220;overcharging Americans for far too long.&#8221;</p><p>Those are fair arguments. They also get much harder to check once FICO&#8217;s prices become confidential, which is exactly why an investigator&#8217;s access matters.</p><h2><strong>Bottom line</strong></h2><p>FICO&#8217;s price hikes have drawn concern from Democrats and Republicans across two administrations. But the most concrete state action this year  has come from a Republican attorney general in Tallahassee and a Republican senator from Missouri.</p><p>Democrats need to get back in this fight.</p><p>If Democratic-led states want to lead on housing affordability, the tools are already in their attorney general&#8217;s offices. If Congressional Democrats in Congress want to follow-through on their pledge to address affordability, they should add FICO to their list of oversight actions to take immediately upon being sworn in this January.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[MAHA Lost the Midterms. Its Leaders Cashed In.]]></title><description><![CDATA[The midterms tested whether Make America Healthy Again is a political movement. What survived the night is the part that was never on the ballot: the business]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/maha-lost-the-midterms-its-leaders</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/maha-lost-the-midterms-its-leaders</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 18:24:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RFAI!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5fb28aea-6d53-4bf7-bd50-4754a418c60f_1280x1280.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>Big Picture</strong></h2><p>Roger Marshall spent two years as one of the faces of Make America Healthy Again (aka MAHA) in the Senate, chairing the MAHA Caucus built around Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.&#8217;s agenda.</p><p>On Tuesday night, he <a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://www.thedailybeast.com/rfk-jr-and-maha-suffer-brutal-election-night-wipeout___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OmRmMjA6YmZmNDAzZjFkOGM3OGJlZTE2N2IxMzZjYzJmZTIzMWVkYTNkMmE2N2JmYjU0OTdhMjRiZmNmMTUwNThhNjcwNTpwOlQ6Rg">lost his Kansas seat</a> to Democrat Adam Hamilton, becoming the first Republican in nearly a century to lose a Senate race in the state. In Iowa, Zach Lahn, the gubernatorial candidate whose race Kennedy had called &#8220;the most important election going on in this country,&#8221; <a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://www.statnews.com/2026/11/04/midterm-health-policy-winners-losers-medicare-for-all-rfk-jr/___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OjdkZmE6ODdhMjliMGQ0YjJhZDkzYzI1MTBmNWFkMTdhMWMzZjFjNjkyN2EwOGJmZGRiM2JlNjliZjlmZTliMjRhNjhhNTpwOlQ6Rg">conceded to Democrat Rob Sand</a>. By Wednesday morning, <a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/election-day-2026-midterms/___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OjI5MGI6NDQzZWQyNTA4MzczYTRjODMyOWU1NGY3ZTFkNTI1N2NjNzYzNTI5N2FkYzIxYWZhOWY3YmJhOWYyZmMyZmMyYTpwOlQ6Rg">Democrats had taken control</a> of both the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate.</p><p>The MAHA movement&#8217;s best-known voices had little to say about it. For two years, MAHA&#8217;s allies sold the movement to Republicans as a decisive voting bloc, backed by a $100 million fundraising campaign and claims that MAHA voters could make up roughly a tenth of the electorate. On Tuesday, that bloc could not save the candidates who embraced it most closely.</p><p>A closer look at the movement&#8217;s most visible figures helps explain why the promise rang hollow. For many of them, <em><strong>MAHA was never only a cause; it was also a revenue stream.</strong></em></p><p>When the two pulled in different directions, the revenue usually won, and their audiences were rarely told. Only one of the two was on the ballot.</p><h2><strong>The (Broken) Political Promise</strong></h2><p>&#8220;The midterms are existential for the MAHA movement,&#8221; Tony Lyons, president of MAHA PAC, <a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://www.dailysignal.com/2026/03/13/exclusive-super-pac-launches-100-million-strategy-bolster-maha-candidates-midterms/___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OjI1NTY6MmI0MDFhMzM4ZjU4MGNjOTQ3MmJlMzZlNDYzMTZiMGM0ZWRjNjFiMzJjNDA2MjYwNzMyNWNhNmYyMWYxMTcyODpwOlQ6Rg">said in March</a> as the super PAC launched a $100 million fundraising campaign to support Trump-endorsed MAHA candidates.</p><p>The PAC said the money would fund targeted campaigns, voter outreach and grassroots mobilization.</p><p>The pitch had been building for months. In August 2025, Lyons, then leading the advocacy group MAHA Action, promised to &#8220;<a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://www.axios.com/2025/08/24/rfk-jr-maha-strategy-2026-midterms___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OmM1MWQ6Yjc3ZTc5NTM2ZWI2N2Y0Y2M5MTkyNmMxNjVmMDgzNzZhZDNhMTViYzZhZjM5YjM0YWE4MzljZTQ1YzY3MWFiMTpwOlQ6Rg">bring out every last MAHA mom, every health-conscious voter, everyone in America who is sick of being lied to by Big Pharma, Big Food and Big Ag</a>.&#8221; This February, a <a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://www.axios.com/2026/02/13/rfk-midterm-election-maha-voters___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OjIyYjA6MjU2ZTNkYmUzZWM2Y2M1ZDg1NTQyNWJhM2ZmMmYwZDgxM2VjNTExMzYzZjFlYmIyYWMwNzBmYjE2M2ViYWY3NDpwOlQ6Rg">MAHA Action memo</a> to Republican campaign leaders warned that the party was &#8220;renting MAHA voters&#8221; and had not yet won them over.</p><p>The money did not follow.</p><p>By April, MAHA PAC and its only aligned super PAC had about $412,000 in cash left after a few dozen donations, roughly half of them from entities tied to the drug industry, <a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://www.rawstory.com/todd-lyons-2676811364/___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OjAzMTA6NDUzZDI4MTU5ZmQ2ODQzODdkZTY4Y2Y0MzdhNzkxNGQ1MmY3MWYxOGFkYmY2YmM0MTIzYzVjMWVmMmVmZDNiMjpwOlQ6Rg">Politico reported</a>. In late October, <a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://politicalwire.com/2026/10/24/maha-sits-out-the-midterms/___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OjFiZjU6ZGZjMmQ3YzhjMTFjOGU1ZjdlY2EyZmVkOTFmNzkyMmQ1NDA5MWIwNDQ3NTdlZTc3MmM2MmRiZDg2ODIwMzJhOTpwOlQ6Rg">the Wall Street Journal reported</a> that allied MAHA super PACs and nonprofits had spent roughly $4 million on candidates since January 2025, &#8220;far less than the $100 million promised,&#8221; and that most of the donors who had backed Kennedy in the last cycle were &#8220;missing in the midterms.&#8221;</p><p>Neither, by and large, did the movement&#8217;s biggest personalities.</p><p>The results were a rout. <a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/election-day-2026-midterms/___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OjI5MGI6NDQzZWQyNTA4MzczYTRjODMyOWU1NGY3ZTFkNTI1N2NjNzYzNTI5N2FkYzIxYWZhOWY3YmJhOWYyZmMyZmMyYTpwOlQ6Rg">Early exit polls</a> put President Trump&#8217;s approval at 38 percent, on pace for a record low for a president in a midterm, and analysts pointed first to the economy, the Iran war and the president himself. Health policy was not the headline of the night, but MAHA&#8217;s candidates went down with the rest. STAT News called the outcome &#8220;<a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://www.statnews.com/2026/11/04/midterm-health-policy-winners-losers-medicare-for-all-rfk-jr/___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OjdkZmE6ODdhMjliMGQ0YjJhZDkzYzI1MTBmNWFkMTdhMWMzZjFjNjkyN2EwOGJmZGRiM2JlNjliZjlmZTliMjRhNjhhNTpwOlQ6Rg">a potentially fatal blow</a>&#8220; to Kennedy&#8217;s movement.</p><p>MAHA&#8217;s candidates had to win. Its leaders did not.</p><h2><strong>The Test MAHA Set</strong></h2><p>MAHA&#8217;s central promise is transparency. Its leaders built their followings by telling audiences what industry wouldn&#8217;t: who funds the studies, what&#8217;s really in the product, who profits from the advice.</p><p>It turns out that &#8220;Follow the money&#8221; is less a slogan than the movement&#8217;s method.</p><p>Below, this article applies that method to the movement&#8217;s own leaders by asking three questions:</p><ol><li><p>Where do their products come from?</p></li><li><p>Who pays them?</p></li><li><p>What do they sell?</p></li></ol><p>In each case, it asks whether their audience was told.</p><p>Two patterns emerge:</p><ol><li><p>Sometimes the money wins outright, and the cause gives way.</p></li><li><p>More often, the cause and the business are built to be inseparable, and the financial stake is simply left out.</p></li></ol><p>Neither pattern depends on winning an election.</p><h2><strong>Test 1 - Where do MAHA leaders&#8217; products come from?</strong></h2><p>In August, President Trump <a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://ruralradio.com/rrn/news/trump-says-300000-metric-tons-of-beef-will-enter-u-s-tariff-free/___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OjVlN2I6MmZkZWRiZTYwMDQ0MmVhNzZlY2UzNTJmNTY3ZWNjZTgxNjBmZTFkYjgwYjE4MTNiYWUzZTc1ZWRhZjkzNDUyYjpwOlQ6Rg">announced on Truth Social</a> that up to 300,000 metric tons of beef could enter the United States without tariffs over the next 90 days, a bid to bring down grocery prices that had risen nearly 10 percent in a year. <em><strong>Pushback from his own coalition came quickly.</strong></em></p><p>Alex Clark, one of the most-followed voices in the MAHA movement, <a href="https://x.com/Realalexclark/status/2090826164688605273?s=20">asked publicly</a> why the &#8220;America First&#8221; answer to expensive beef was more foreign beef.</p><p>Vani Hari said nothing. Her silence stood out. Hari, known to millions as &#8220;the Food Babe,&#8221; had just <a href="https://x.com/thefoodbabe/status/2093344854923157894?s=20">quote-posted</a> the White House in support of American farmers and ranchers.</p><p>Hari made her name pressuring food companies to come clean about what was in their products, and she has since become a fixture at Department of Health and Human Services events. <a href="https://shop.truvani.com/">Truvani</a>, the company she co-founded, sells that credibility, marketing its products as clean and honest alternatives to an opaque food industry.</p><p>However, the supply chain behind the brand tells a more global story.</p><p>Truvani&#8217;s flagship Grass Fed Collagen Peptides are sourced from Argentine cattle, and its Organic Monk Fruit comes from China. Sourcing ingredients abroad is common and legal. <em><strong>The issue is the gap between the brand&#8217;s America-first posture and its practice,</strong></em> <em><strong>and what that gap may have meant when an America-first policy fight landed on Hari&#8217;s own product category.</strong></em></p><p>Truvani&#8217;s commitment to disclosure has limits of its own. A company built on calling out industry opacity keeps a &#8220;<a href="https://www.truvani.com/testresults">test results</a>&#8220; page that shows a single lead test with no date and no laboratory named.</p><p>Before the beef fight, ranchers got a social media post from Hari. During it, they got silence. Hari&#8217;s support for American ranchers lasted one post. Her collagen never stopped coming from Argentina.</p><p>And on Tuesday, as MAHA&#8217;s candidates lost, the collagen was still for sale.</p><h2><strong>Test 2 - Who pays these MAHA leaders?</strong></h2><p>Clark has built a large following as a voice of skepticism toward the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries, much of it through Culture Apothecary, a show that presents her as an independent voice in the wellness world.</p><p>Turning Point USA&#8217;s tax filings tell a different story.</p><p>The conservative group&#8217;s <a href="https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/r01/___https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/800835023___.YXAzOnAyLXB1YmxpYy1hZmZhaXJzLTJkMWIxZGM2OmM6Z29vZ2xlX21haWxfYXR0YWNobWVudDplZjc4ODE3NTNmMzFhYWM4ODU1MTIxYjU0OTEzNGMxZDo3OjI5OTU6NDhlM2U5MzlhOTU4YmMzMjM5Nzg5ZDc2Y2ExNGRlZTQxYjY1ZjNiNjk4MTI5ZTlkNDY5MzM0M2Q1YTFhMTkxYzpwOlQ6Rg">Form 990</a> lists Alexandra Clark as a &#8220;Contributor&#8221; and reports that it paid her $210,377 in the fiscal year that ended in June 2025, up from $120,393 three years earlier. According to a Turning Point <a href="https://backend.tpusa.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Culture-Apothecary-Press-Release.pdf">press release</a>, Turning Point also owns the Culture Apothecary brand.</p><p>Clark&#8217;s affiliation with Turning Point is no secret, and she has spoken about it. <em><strong>The question is what her audience understands.</strong></em> Another interesting connection, most likely not understood by her audience, is her connection to a pharmaceutical company called The Wellness Company. The outwardly anti-pharmaceutical podcaster has an active brand affiliation with the company, using her face to <a href="https://www.twc.health/pages/aclark-medkit">market</a> their medical kit that includes amoxicillin. At a recent <a href="https://www.tpr.org/2025-11-30/closed-door-maha-summit-offers-a-glimpse-into-the-administrations-evolving-health-priorities">closed door MAHA Summit</a>, speakers weighed the incentives for practitioners to overprescribe antibiotics like amoxicillin.</p><p>The issue isn&#8217;t her views. It&#8217;s whether her audience knows who is behind the platform delivering them. And unlike the candidates MAHA promised to elect, her salary was never up to the voters.</p><h2><strong>Test 3 - What products do they sell?</strong></h2><p>Kelly Ryerson, who posts as &#8220;Glyphosate Girl,&#8221; is among the country&#8217;s most prominent activists against the herbicide glyphosate.</p><p>According to a <a href="https://www.contactorganics.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/20221207-Contact-Organics-Press-Release-Global-Advisory-Board.pdf">press release</a> from 2022, she was named to the Global Advisory Board of Contact Organics, a company that sells glyphosate-free weed control products. The role does not appear in her biographies, social media profiles or disclosure statements.</p><p>For Ryerson, <em><strong>the cause and the business point the same way, and that is the problem.</strong></em> Every warning about glyphosate is also, in effect, a sales pitch for its replacement. Her audience isn&#8217;t told that a company she advises sells that replacement.</p><p>Zen Honeycutt built Moms Across America into one of the most visible anti-glyphosate groups in the country. The organization ran a storefront selling <a href="https://www.momsacrossamerica.com/products/restore-for-gut-health">ION* Gut Support</a> at $72 a bottle under its own promo code, MOMS15, marketed as able to repair &#8220;gut damage caused by glyphosate.&#8221;</p><p>The pattern is the same: <em><strong>the group warns about the damage, then sells the fix.</strong></em></p><p>No election result changes that business. If anything, a movement that has lost its leverage in Washington has more reason to keep its audience afraid.</p><h2><strong>The Business Model</strong></h2><p>The reason MAHA&#8217;s leaders came through Tuesday unscathed is structural.</p><p>Their income is built on affiliate codes, private-label supplements, sponsorships, salaries and advisory roles. None of it depends on winning a seat in Congress, and all of it depends on keeping an audience engaged.</p><p>The economics are simple, and they explain why Tuesday&#8217;s losses barely touched the movement&#8217;s leaders. A wellness influencer&#8217;s audience is the asset. Trust is what turns that audience into revenue, and there are several ways to collect it.</p><p>The most common is the affiliate code: a discount like MOMS15 that tracks each sale back to the person who promoted it and pays them a share. A step up is the private-label product. Instead of earning a cut of someone else&#8217;s supplement, the influencer puts their own name on one, as Hari has with Truvani, and keeps the margin. Then there are the arrangements audiences rarely see: sponsorships, salaried roles with organizations that own the platform, and advisory board seats with companies whose products line up with the influencer&#8217;s message.</p><p>What these have in common is that they reward attention, not outcomes. A campaign has to win. A supplement only has to sell, and fear sells well.</p><p>That&#8217;s also why disclosure matters more here than in ordinary advertising. A follower who trusts an influencer because she seems independent has no reason to discount her advice, unless someone tells them who is paying.</p><h2><strong>Bottom Line - Read the Label</strong></h2><p>On Tuesday night, MAHA&#8217;s candidates gave their concession speeches. The storefronts stayed open.</p><p>The sponsorships, salaries and advisory boards were never on the ballot, and they will outlast the movement&#8217;s moment in Washington.</p><p>MAHA promised Republicans a movement. For many of its most visible leaders, it was a revenue stream all along.</p><p>The movement tells its followers to read the label. Its leaders should put their own on the package.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Who Holds the Power? An Interactive Guide to Political Control of America’s State Governments]]></title><description><![CDATA[Introducing the Blue Laboratories State Control Atlas&#8212;an interactive look at governors, legislatures, and the governing coalitions emerging from the 2026 midterm elections]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/who-holds-the-power-an-interactive</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/who-holds-the-power-an-interactive</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 16:57:52 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_rf7!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffcbe5c0-1938-46e9-b8d6-cae367501ba2_2414x1572.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://bluelaboratories-interactivedashboard.netlify.app/" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_rf7!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffcbe5c0-1938-46e9-b8d6-cae367501ba2_2414x1572.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_rf7!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffcbe5c0-1938-46e9-b8d6-cae367501ba2_2414x1572.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_rf7!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffcbe5c0-1938-46e9-b8d6-cae367501ba2_2414x1572.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_rf7!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffcbe5c0-1938-46e9-b8d6-cae367501ba2_2414x1572.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_rf7!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffcbe5c0-1938-46e9-b8d6-cae367501ba2_2414x1572.png" width="2414" height="1572" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_rf7!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffcbe5c0-1938-46e9-b8d6-cae367501ba2_2414x1572.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_rf7!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffcbe5c0-1938-46e9-b8d6-cae367501ba2_2414x1572.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_rf7!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffcbe5c0-1938-46e9-b8d6-cae367501ba2_2414x1572.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!_rf7!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fffcbe5c0-1938-46e9-b8d6-cae367501ba2_2414x1572.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">Click image above to explore Blue Laboratories State Control Atlas</figcaption></figure></div><h2>An Interactive Tool - <a href="https://bluelaboratories-interactivedashboard.netlify.app/">Blue Laboratories State Control Atlas</a></h2><p>An election result tells us who won an office. Understanding what comes next requires another question: who will have the power to govern?</p><p>A Democratic governor working with a Republican legislature faces a different set of possibilities than a Democratic governor whose party controls both chambers. A legislative majority can open the door to a policy agenda&#8212;or give an opposition party the ability to stop one.</p><p>To help readers follow those differences, Blue Laboratories has created the<a href="https://bluelaboratories-interactivedashboard.netlify.app/"> State Control Atlas</a>, an interactive dashboard covering all 50 states.</p><h3 style="text-align: center;"><em><strong><a href="https://bluelaboratories-interactivedashboard.netlify.app/">Click here to explore the Blue Laboratories State Control Atlas &#8594;</a></strong></em></h3><p>The tool brings together three pieces of information: <em><strong>the party holding the governorship, the party controlling the state Senate, and the party controlling the House or Assembly.</strong></em> Readers can search for a state, filter by region or type of government, and select individual states for details and source links.</p><p>Its central question is straightforward: where will one party hold the governorship and both legislative chambers&#8212;a configuration commonly called a trifecta?</p><p>In the dashboard&#8217;s provisional November 4 snapshot, <em><strong>19 states are classified as Democratic trifectas, 17 as Republican trifectas, and 6 as divided governments</strong></em>. Overall control remains unresolved in seven states. Nebraska appears separately because its legislature is officially nonpartisan. These are the dashboard&#8217;s classifications, with its sources and exceptions explained inside the tool.</p><p>The <em><strong>before-and-after comparison</strong></em> provides another way to explore the results. It shows the pre-election balance alongside the incoming government indicated by the snapshot. Clicking an after-election segment filters the map to the states in that category.</p><p>The uncertainty deserves attention, too. A state can have divided government established even while one chamber remains unresolved. If the governor and a resolved legislative chamber belong to different parties, the remaining chamber cannot produce a trifecta. Conversely, a state with two Democratic institutions and a third still uncalled cannot yet be counted as a Democratic trifecta.</p><p>That distinction is why the dashboard flags unresolved offices separately from unresolved overall control.</p><p>For Blue Laboratories, this map is a starting point for the work ahead: examining the policies proposed, debated, enacted, and implemented across Democratic-led states. Political control helps establish what might be possible. Following the governing process will reveal what actually happens.</p><p><em>Note: The interactive reflects a saved November 4, 2026 snapshot of projected incoming control. Newly elected officials take office later, reported calls are not certification, and unresolved outcomes may change. Nebraska is treated separately in both comparison bars.</em></p><h3 style="text-align: center;"><em><strong><a href="https://bluelaboratories-interactivedashboard.netlify.app/">Click here to explore the Blue Laboratories State Control Atlas &#8594;</a></strong></em></h3><p></p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Freedom on the Ballot: The Measures That Will Decide Who Controls Your Body, Marriage, and Kids' Futures]]></title><description><![CDATA[From abortion and marriage equality to the rights of transgender kids, voters in several states will decide whether hard-won freedoms get written into law or written out of it]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/freedom-on-the-ballot-the-measures</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/freedom-on-the-ballot-the-measures</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 17:34:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For four years, conservatives have insisted that overturning <em>Roe v. Wade</em> simply &#8220;returned the issue to the people.&#8221; This November, the people get to answer again.</p><p>Since the <em>Dobbs</em> decision in 2022, voters in states as different as Kansas, Michigan, Ohio, and Missouri have sided with reproductive freedom when the question was put to them directly. <em><strong>Rather than accept those results, some Republican legislators are now asking voters to reverse them, often by pairing abortion bans with measures aimed at transgender young people.</strong></em></p><p>That pairing isn&#8217;t an accident. Progressive strategists at the <a href="https://ballot.org/news/june-2026-hot-sheet-2026-anti-trans-measures-relying-on-a-a-2004-playbook/">Ballot Initiative Strategy Center</a> note that it echoes 2004, when same-sex marriage bans landed on the ballot in 13 states to drive conservative turnout in a presidential year.</p><p>Ballot measures strip away party labels, attack ads, and candidate personalities. What&#8217;s left is <em><strong>a simple question: should politicians make this decision, or should you?</strong></em></p><p>This year, voters face that question on three fronts: abortion, marriage and equal protection, and the rights of transgender kids.</p><h2><strong>Abortion: Defend, Restore, or Repeal</strong></h2><p>Four states will vote on abortion this fall, and abortion-rights supporters are not only playing defense.</p><p><strong>In Missouri, lawmakers are asking voters to overturn themselves.</strong> In 2024, Missourians approved a constitutional amendment protecting abortion rights with roughly 1.5 million votes. The Republican-led legislature responded by sending voters <a href="https://www.sos.mo.gov/petitions/2026BallotMeasures">Amendment 3</a>, which would repeal those protections and <a href="https://www.kcur.org/health/2026-09-28/missouri-amendment-3-abortion-ban-criminal">ban nearly all abortions</a>. Abortion would be allowed only in a medical emergency, for a fetal anomaly, or, during the first 12 weeks, for a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. Lawmakers also folded in a constitutional ban on gender-transition procedures for minors, and the yes campaign&#8217;s first TV ad was about &#8220;trans extremists,&#8221; not abortion. Even some anti-abortion activists have called that messaging misleading. An August SLU/YouGov poll found the race essentially tied, with 43% in favor and 44% opposed.</p><p><strong>In Nevada, supporters are trying to lock in a landslide.</strong> Nevadans approved <a href="https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/tracking-2026-nevada-ballot-measures-whats-up-for-a-vote-and-what-fell-short">Question 6</a> with 64.4% of the vote in 2024, but state law requires citizen-initiated amendments to pass twice. A second yes vote would move Nevada&#8217;s current 24-week abortion standard from statute into the constitution, where a future legislature or governor couldn&#8217;t quietly roll it back. Nevadans for Reproductive Freedom has raised more than $815,000 this year; opponents have raised far less.</p><p><strong>In Virginia, reproductive freedom would become a constitutional right.</strong> The Democratic-led General Assembly passed <a href="https://www.wdbj7.com/2026/09/21/virginia-voters-decide-three-constitutional-amendments-november/">two amendments</a> on reproductive freedom and marriage in both 2025 and 2026, as the state requires. Question 1 would establish a constitutional right to reproductive freedom, covering contraception, abortion, miscarriage management, fertility care, and pregnancy care, while allowing third-trimester restrictions with medical exceptions. (See below for Question 2).</p><p><strong>In Idaho, voters could restore care in a ban state.</strong> Idaho&#8217;s near-total abortion ban has no exception to protect a patient&#8217;s health, and a federal judge ruled in August that the omission is <a href="https://www.multistate.us/insider/2026/10/20/state-abortion-ballot-measures-return-in-the-2026-midterms">unconstitutional</a>. The ban has also driven doctors away: one study found a net loss of 94 OB-GYNs within two years. <a href="https://idahocapitalsun.com/2026/07/10/repub/in-deep-red-idaho-support-for-ballot-question-on-abortion-access-is-spread-across-party-lines/">Proposition 1</a>, the Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act, would make abortion legal again up to fetal viability and safeguard birth control and fertility care. A Boise State poll found 61% support, including about 45% of Republicans. Because Idaho doesn&#8217;t allow citizen-initiated constitutional amendments, Prop 1 is a statute that the Legislature could later amend or repeal.</p><p><em><strong>The clearest test is whether reproductive freedom still crosses party lines.</strong></em> If Idaho passes Prop 1 and Missouri rejects Amendment 3, it will be hard for anyone to argue that abortion rights are a coastal, partisan cause. <em><strong>The second test is whether pairing an abortion ban with a ban on care for transgender kids actually works.</strong></em> Missouri&#8217;s yes campaign is betting it does. A loss there would suggest voters can see past a strategy built to change the subject.</p><h2><strong>Marriage and Equal Protection</strong></h2><p><strong>Virginia would finish the job on marriage equality.</strong> Its Question 2 would remove the 2006 amendment defining marriage as one man and one woman. That language has been unenforceable since <em>Obergefell</em> in 2015, but it is still in the constitution. UVA&#8217;s Larry Sabato calls the repeal an &#8220;insurance policy&#8221; in case federal protections change.</p><p><strong>Vermont would guarantee equal protection for everyone.</strong> <a href="https://www.wamc.org/news/2026-07-28/vermonters-to-decide-two-state-constitutional-amendments">Proposal 4</a> would write an explicit equal-protection guarantee into Vermont&#8217;s constitution. The state could not treat people unequally because of their race, religion, or sex, and the amendment names sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression as protected traits too. It cleared the legislature in two consecutive sessions before going to voters.</p><p>Together, Virginia and Vermont offer <em><strong>a chance to write equality into state constitutions rather than carve exceptions out of it.</strong></em></p><h2><strong>Transgender Kids in the Crosshairs</strong></h2><p>The rest of this year&#8217;s measures run the other way, aiming at transgender young people in schools, on sports teams, and in doctors&#8217; offices. These sports and facilities measures will be harder fights, and progressives should be honest about that.</p><p><strong>Arizona would police bathrooms and ballfields.</strong> <a href="https://azsos.gov/elections/ballot-measures">Proposition 318</a>, which the Republican legislature placed on the ballot, would widen Arizona&#8217;s ban on transgender athletes so it reaches additional schools and sports groups. It goes beyond sports: bathrooms, changing areas, and similar spaces would be assigned by the sex on a person&#8217;s birth record, and anyone who believes the rule was broken could sue.</p><p><strong>Colorado is asking two questions in two votes.</strong> <a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/ballots/male-and-female-participation-in-school-and-collegiate-sports-2">Proposition 134</a> would decide by sex who can play on school and college teams. <a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/ballots/prohibit-surgery-on-minors-in-response-to-perception-of-sex-or-gender-2">Proposition 135</a> would outlaw certain surgeries for transgender minors, though it carves out some medical cases. Splitting the questions will show whether voters in a state that has leaned blue for two decades treat them differently.</p><p><strong>Nebraska would write exclusion into its constitution.</strong> <a href="https://sos.nebraska.gov/elections">Initiative 442</a> would write a sports rule into the Nebraska Constitution itself. Every covered team would be labeled boys&#8217;, girls&#8217;, or coed, and students the state counts as male could not join girls&#8217; teams. The rule would apply from kindergarten through college, intramurals included.</p><p><strong>Washington is pairing sex checks with classroom fights.</strong> <a href="https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2025-26/Htm/Initiatives/Initiatives/INITIATIVE%20IL26-638.htm">Initiative 638</a> would bar transgender girls from girls&#8217; K-12 competitions and require a health care provider to verify the biological sex of students in those competitions. That means every girl who plays, not only transgender athletes, could face that verification. A companion measure, <a href="https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/voters/proposed-ballot-measure-information">Initiative 1</a>, would bring back provisions on school records, curriculum review, and parent notifications from the state&#8217;s 2024 parental-rights law, which lawmakers later revised.</p><h2><strong>Who Decides</strong></h2><p>On November 3, <em><strong>the question in most of these states comes down to the same thing: who decides. For a growing number of voters, the answer has been not the politicians.</strong></em></p><h2><strong>State Ballot Initiative Summary</strong></h2><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png" width="1248" height="778" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/f9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:778,&quot;width&quot;:1248,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:195164,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.blue-laboratories.com/i/223202982?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mHTV!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff9a1eac5-edf7-47ca-b3ee-fb7d7a19045a_1248x778.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Pocketbook Politics: The Ballot Fights Over Billionaires, Taxes, and Working Families]]></title><description><![CDATA[From a billionaire tax in California to a millionaires' tax in Washington and union rights in Vermont, voters will decide whether the economy keeps tilting toward the top]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/pocketbook-politics-the-ballot-fights</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/pocketbook-politics-the-ballot-fights</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 16:51:40 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5lfE!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6c88aa1c-e4b9-4844-a22a-44fd5ac5ee88_1244x822.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>The Big Picture</strong></h2><p>Politicians in both parties love to talk about &#8220;working families.&#8221; This November, voters in a handful of states get to decide what that phrase is actually worth.</p><p>In several states, the question is whether the wealthiest residents should pay more. In others, the wealthy have answered with competing measures written to make sure they don&#8217;t.</p><p>The stakes are higher than usual. Federal Medicaid cuts have left states scrambling to fill holes in health care and food assistance budgets, and the money has to come from somewhere.</p><p><a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/04/06/top-tax-frustrations-for-americans-feeling-that-some-wealthy-people-corporations-dont-pay-fair-share/">Polling shows</a> that most Americans think the rich don&#8217;t pay their fair share. These measures test whether that sentiment survives contact with a well-funded opposition campaign.</p><h2><strong>Taxing the Top</strong></h2><p><strong>In California, it&#8217;s billionaires vs. everyone else.</strong> <a href="https://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/40/analysis.htm">Proposition 40</a>, sponsored by SEIU United Healthcare Workers West, would ask California&#8217;s billionaires to pay a one-time levy of as much as 5% of their wealth, with most real estate and retirement savings left out of the calculation. The nonpartisan <a href="https://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/40/analysis.htm">Legislative Analyst&#8217;s Office</a> estimates it would raise &#8220;tens of billions of dollars,&#8221; with 90% going to health care and the rest to education and food assistance. Supporters pitch it as a way to fill holes left by federal Medicaid cuts. Billionaires answered with two competing measures, <a href="https://www.cpapracticeadvisor.com/2026/09/23/california-voters-back-billionaire-tax-and-measures-that-could-block-it-new-poll-finds/190410/">Propositions 41 and 42</a>, funded in large part by Google co-founder Sergey Brin. Either could block Prop 40 if it passes with more votes. A <a href="https://www.ppic.org/press-release/likely-voters-send-mixed-signals-on-billionaire-wealth-tax-becerra-maintains-wide-lead-over-hilton/">September PPIC poll</a> found 52% support for Prop 40, but majorities also backed both countermeasures, which means confused voters could cancel out their own choice. Notably, Governor Gavin Newsom, a Democrat with potential presidential aspirations, opposes Prop 40.</p><p><strong>In Washington, voters will decide whether to keep the millionaires&#8217; tax.</strong> Earlier this year, the Washington legislature passed a 9.9% tax on household income above $1 million, which officials estimate about 25,000 households would pay. It is expected to raise <a href="https://www.axios.com/local/seattle/2026/10/15/washington-initiative-645-income-tax-repeal-2026-ballot-voter-guide">more than $3 billion a year</a> starting in 2028, while funding tax cuts for small businesses, expanded rebates for low- and middle-income residents, and an end to sales tax on diapers and hygiene products. <strong>Initiative 645</strong> would repeal the tax and ban any future state or local income tax, permanently locking in one of the most regressive tax systems in the country. Notably, I-645 would keep the tax breaks for everyone else while eliminating the revenue that pays for them.</p><p><strong>In Colorado, the choice is a fairer income tax or a permanent cap.</strong> <a href="https://www.axios.com/local/denver/2026/10/16/amendment-87-proposition-nn-136-137-colorado-voter-guide">Amendment 87</a> would replace Colorado&#8217;s flat 4.4% income tax with six graduated brackets starting in 2027. Most taxpayers would get a cut, higher earners would pay more, and the state would raise up to $2.7 billion in its first full year for schools, health care, and child care. <a href="https://www.coloradopolitics.com/2026/10/02/income-tax-cap-colorado-proposition-136/">Proposition 136</a> would cap income tax rates at 4.4%, blocking Amendment 87. Democratic Governor Jared Polis opposes 87 and supports 136, along with Proposition NN, which would let the state keep up to $4.6 billion more under its TABOR revenue limit.</p><p>The opposition has learned a new trick. In California and Colorado, a tax on the top doesn&#8217;t just face a &#8220;no&#8221; campaign. It faces a competing measure on the same ballot that would cancel it. If voters back both sides, as California&#8217;s polling suggests some will, <em><strong>the side with the better-funded campaign may win without changing a single mind.</strong></em></p><p>The results won&#8217;t fall neatly along party lines, either. Democratic governors in California and Colorado oppose the progressive tax measures in their own states, arguing they would hurt their states&#8217; economies or drive away wealthy residents. Their voters will decide whether that warning outweighs the cost of cuts to health care and schools.</p><h2><strong>Tax Cuts With a Catch</strong></h2><p><strong>Florida&#8217;s tax cut could be paid for by cops and firefighters.</strong> <a href="https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/florida-amendment-3-what-a-yes-or-no-vote-would-mean/3873576/">Amendment 3</a> would shield more of a primary home&#8217;s value from local, non-school property taxes, lifting the exemption to $150,000 in 2027 and $250,000 in 2028, and cut the assessment cap on rentals and second homes from 10% to 5%. That sounds like relief, but local governments would lose substantial revenue, and the <a href="https://www.wgcu.org/government-politics/2026-08-03/sheriffs-police-firefighters-groups-sound-alarm-over-property-tax-measure">Florida Sheriffs Association</a> and firefighter groups warn it could cut public safety budgets. Newer Floridians would wait years for the full benefit. It needs 60% to pass, and <a href="https://www.cpapracticeadvisor.com/?p=191562">recent polls</a> range from 42% to 63% support, so it&#8217;s unclear whether it will clear that bar.</p><p><strong>Missouri and North Carolina would shift the burden down.</strong> Missouri&#8217;s legislature has asked voters to <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/2026_ballot_measures">phase out the state income tax</a> while changing sales taxes, and North Carolina&#8217;s would cap its income tax at 3.5% and limit property tax increases. Replacing income taxes with sales taxes generally shifts the load toward lower- and middle-income families, who spend a larger share of what they earn.</p><h2><strong>Workers and Homes</strong></h2><p><strong>Vermont and Massachusetts would expand the right to organize.</strong> Vermont&#8217;s <a href="https://www.wamc.org/news/2026-07-28/vermonters-to-decide-two-state-constitutional-amendments">Proposal 3</a> would make workers&#8217; right to organize and bargain collectively a constitutional right, joining a short list of states that guarantee it. In Massachusetts, <a href="https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/massachusetts-ballot-questions-2026/4026011/">Question 2</a> would let public defenders and other staff at the Committee for Public Counsel Services unionize and bargain collectively.</p><p><strong>Massachusetts would make room for starter homes.</strong> <a href="https://www.sec.state.ma.us/divisions/elections/research-and-statistics/2026-information-for-voters/2026-ballot-question7.htm">Question 7</a> would allow single-family homes on lots of 5,000 square feet or more, overriding local zoning, a direct shot at the large-lot rules that keep housing scarce and expensive. The state&#8217;s municipal association opposes it as a one-size-fits-all mandate.</p><h2><strong>Bottom Line</strong></h2><p>These contests will offer one of the clearest answers available to a question both parties claim to care about: <em><strong>when the bill comes due, who should pay it?</strong></em></p><p></p><h2><strong>State Ballot Initiative Summary</strong></h2><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5lfE!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6c88aa1c-e4b9-4844-a22a-44fd5ac5ee88_1244x822.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5lfE!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6c88aa1c-e4b9-4844-a22a-44fd5ac5ee88_1244x822.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5lfE!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6c88aa1c-e4b9-4844-a22a-44fd5ac5ee88_1244x822.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5lfE!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6c88aa1c-e4b9-4844-a22a-44fd5ac5ee88_1244x822.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5lfE!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6c88aa1c-e4b9-4844-a22a-44fd5ac5ee88_1244x822.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!5lfE!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F6c88aa1c-e4b9-4844-a22a-44fd5ac5ee88_1244x822.png" width="1244" height="822" 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class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Rigging the Rules: The Ballot Measures That Will Decide How America Votes]]></title><description><![CDATA[Gerrymandering, voter ID mandates, ranked-choice repeals, and attacks on citizen initiatives: this November, voters will decide whether democracy gets wider or narrower]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/rigging-the-rules-the-ballot-measures</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/rigging-the-rules-the-ballot-measures</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 18:09:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PIIo!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffbf15f32-ac0e-4c6e-9f49-24709d058eb8_1242x902.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>The Big Picture</strong></h2><p>Most elections decide who holds power. This year, a record number of <em><strong>ballot measures will decide how power is won.</strong></em></p><p>Of the 145 statewide measures on ballots this fall, 39 deal with elections, a record, according to National Conference of State Legislatures figures reported by <a href="https://www.votebeat.org/national/2026/10/19/ballot-measures-2026-election-voter-id-redistricting/">Votebeat</a>. Six states will vote on new voter ID requirements, also a record. Six more will vote to declare that only citizens may vote, something that is already the law everywhere in the country for state and federal elections.</p><p>Some of these measures would expand access. Many more would add hurdles, lock in partisan maps, or make it harder for citizens to put questions on the ballot at all.</p><p>The common thread is a fight over who gets to participate, and who gets to set the rules for everyone else. On this year&#8217;s ballots, that fight comes down to four questions.</p><h2><strong>Who Draws the Lines?</strong></h2><p><strong>Missouri voters get the last word on a gerrymander.</strong> Last fall, at President Trump&#8217;s urging, Missouri Republicans redrew the state&#8217;s congressional map mid-decade. The new lines <a href="https://www.kcur.org/podcast/up-to-date/2026-09-29/missouri-proposition-a-congressional-map-2026-election">stretch Rep. Emanuel Cleaver&#8217;s Kansas City district</a> nearly 200 miles east, pairing majority-Black urban neighborhoods with rural counties to create a safe Republican seat. Citizens with People Not Politicians gathered more than 300,000 signatures to force a referendum. The secretary of state tried to keep it off the ballot, but the <a href="https://missouriindependent.com/2026/09/03/missouri-supreme-court-blocks-gerrymandered-congressional-map-orders-referendum-vote/">Missouri Supreme Court unanimously ruled</a> that voters will decide. Under <strong>Proposition A</strong>, a yes vote approves the 2025 map and a no vote keeps the 2022 lines, which are being used this November. Polling shows voters evenly split.</p><p><strong>Maryland Democrats want to fight fire with fire.</strong> <a href="https://marylandmatters.org/2026/09/25/democrats-unions-advocates-push-for-support-on-question-3-on-redistricting/">Question 3</a> would remove the state constitution&#8217;s standards for drawing congressional districts, clearing the way for Democrats to redraw a map that already gives them seven of eight seats. Supporters, including Democratic lawmakers and labor unions, frame it as a direct response to Trump&#8217;s mid-decade redistricting push in red states. Republicans call it a confusing ploy to energize the Democratic base, and even some sympathetic voters may balk at answering one gerrymander with another. The Maryland Supreme Court rewrote the ballot question after finding the original wording misleading, and dueling polls show anywhere from 25% to 31% of voters undecided. Changes couldn&#8217;t affect races until 2028.</p><p><strong>Colorado conservatives want to tie Democrats&#8217; hands.</strong> <a href="https://www.axios.com/local/denver/2026/10/15/amendment-86-colorado-voting-guide">Amendment 86</a>, backed by the conservative group Advance Colorado, would require any off-cycle congressional map to win approval from the state&#8217;s independent commission and its supreme court. It follows a Democratic push to redraw the map before 2028. Supporters call it gerrymandering protection. Opponents argue it would leave Colorado unable to respond while Republican states redraw their own maps at will.</p><p><em><strong>These may be the most revealing votes of the year.</strong></em> Missouri voters will be the first to directly judge a Trump-era mid-decade gerrymander. Maryland voters will decide whether Democrats should answer in kind. How each state votes will show whether voters punish map-rigging in general or only when the other side does it.</p><h2><strong>Who Gets to Vote?</strong></h2><p><strong>Virginia would restore the right to vote.</strong> Virginia is one of the few states where a felony conviction can mean losing the right to vote for life unless the governor intervenes. <a href="https://www.wdbj7.com/2026/09/21/virginia-voters-decide-three-constitutional-amendments-november/">Question 3</a> would establish a fundamental right to vote and automatically restore voting rights to people when they&#8217;re released from prison. It would also replace the constitution&#8217;s &#8220;mentally incompetent&#8221; language with a narrower standard.</p><p><strong>Six states are riding a record wave of voter ID.</strong> Voters in <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/2026_ballot_measures">Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, North Carolina, and Ohio</a> will decide voter ID measures. The biggest fights are over mail ballots. California&#8217;s <a href="https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/california-proposition-39-november/4079682/">Proposition 39</a>, from Republican Assemblymember Carl DeMaio&#8217;s Reform California, would require ID at the polls and ID numbers on mail ballots; Common Cause warns it sets no rules for fixing ballot errors. A UC Berkeley poll found 56% initial support, falling to 39% once voters learned who was behind it. Arizona&#8217;s legislature-referred <a href="https://www.fox10phoenix.com/election/2026-election-arizona-prop-144-explained-what-know-about-new-voter-id-rules-election-administration">Proposition 144</a> would require proof of identity from every voter, including mail voters, and critics say it could burden older, disabled, and rural voters. In Nevada, <a href="https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/tracking-2026-nevada-ballot-measures-whats-up-for-a-vote-and-what-fell-short">Question 7</a> returns for its required second vote after winning 73.2% in 2024.</p><p><strong>Six more are solving a problem that doesn&#8217;t exist.</strong> <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/2026_ballot_measures">Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, South Dakota, and West Virginia</a> will vote on measures declaring that only U.S. citizens may vote. Noncitizens are already barred from voting in state and federal elections. One <a href="https://ballot.org/news/june-2026-hot-sheet-2026-anti-trans-measures-relying-on-a-a-2004-playbook/">review in Arkansas</a> found noncitizens made up about 0.00002% of registered voters. These measures have passed every time since 2018, so the real question is what they signal and what comes next, such as proof-of-citizenship rules that could trip up millions of eligible Americans who don&#8217;t have papers on hand.</p><p><strong>Massachusetts would let voters register on Election Day.</strong> <a href="https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/massachusetts-ballot-questions-2026/4026011/">Question 4</a> would let eligible voters register or update their address at the polls on Election Day, with proof of residency, a reform already used in <a href="https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-voter-registration">24 states and D.C.</a> The state Republican Party opposes it.</p><p>Voter ID and citizenship measures poll well, and they have a long winning streak: voters approved 10 of 13 voter ID measures between 2004 and 2025. <em><strong>Progressives shouldn&#8217;t expect to win most of those fights this year.</strong></em> The more useful signal is the margin, and whether California&#8217;s Prop 39 sinks once voters learn who wrote it, as the Berkeley poll suggests it might.</p><h2><strong>How Do We Pick Winners?</strong></h2><p><strong>Alaska is voting on ranked-choice voting, again.</strong> Alaskans adopted open top-four primaries, ranked-choice general elections, and stronger dark-money disclosure in 2020. A repeal failed in 2024 <a href="https://alaskabeacon.com/2026/07/29/alaskans-to-vote-on-ballot-measure-that-would-overhaul-state-election-system/">by just 737 votes</a>. <strong>Ballot Measure 2</strong> would restore closed partisan primaries and, less noticed, repeal the 2020 disclosure rules for out-of-state and &#8220;true source&#8221; donations. The repeal campaign&#8217;s biggest funder is the <a href="https://alaskabeacon.com/2026/07/29/alaskans-to-vote-on-ballot-measure-that-would-overhaul-state-election-system/">Aurora Action Network</a>, a Wisconsin super PAC partly funded by Pennsylvania billionaire Jeff Yass, which has supplied $846,000 of its $1.1 million.</p><p><strong>Massachusetts would open up its primaries.</strong> <a href="https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/massachusetts-ballot-questions-2026/4026011/">Question 3</a> would replace party primaries with a single all-candidate primary, with the top two advancing, a change that third-party advocates warn would shut them out of November.</p><h2><strong>Who Gets to Write the Rules?</strong></h2><p>Then there are the quieter measures that change who gets to make the rules at all. They won&#8217;t dominate cable news, but <em><strong>they could shape what reaches the ballot for decades.</strong></em></p><p><strong>North Dakota and South Dakota would raise the bar for the people.</strong> <a href="https://news.ballotpedia.org/2026/08/26/at-least-eight-ballot-measures-in-2026-will-address-state-initiative-and-referendum-processes-the-highest-number-since-2000/">Constitutional Measure 1 and Amendment L</a> would require 60% of the vote, not a simple majority, to amend either state&#8217;s constitution. These follow years of voters using initiatives to pass policies legislators wouldn&#8217;t, from Medicaid expansion in South Dakota to term limits in North Dakota. A 60% rule would let a minority of just over 40% block what most voters want.</p><p><strong>Montana and Michigan want corporate money out of politics.</strong> Montana&#8217;s <a href="https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/09/16/deep-in-trump-country-a-revolt-against-corporate-money-could-reshape-political-spending">I-194</a>, the &#8220;Montana Plan,&#8221; takes a novel route around <em>Citizens United</em>: rather than challenge corporate speech rights, it redefines the powers the state grants corporations so they no longer include election spending. Former Republican Governor Marc Racicot supports it; the Montana Chamber of Commerce went to court to block it from the ballot and lost. Michigan&#8217;s <a href="https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/fact-check-would-money-out-of-politics-proposal-live-up-to-its-name/">Proposal 2</a> would bar regulated utilities like DTE and Consumers Energy, and companies with $250,000 or more in state contracts, from giving to candidates who oversee them, and require donor disclosure for issue ads close to elections.</p><h2><strong>Bottom Line</strong></h2><p>Taken together, the results will say a lot about whether Americans want a democracy that makes room for more voters, or one that makes it easier for those in power to stay there.</p><h3><strong>State Ballot Initiative Summary</strong></h3><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!PIIo!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ffbf15f32-ac0e-4c6e-9f49-24709d058eb8_1242x902.png" 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fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Red State Lessons – A Promise Has to Be Built to Be Kept]]></title><description><![CDATA[What a decade of Tennessee Promise can teach us about free college: the price cut was the headline but the system did the work]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/red-state-lessons-a-promise-has-to</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/red-state-lessons-a-promise-has-to</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 14:13:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RFAI!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5fb28aea-6d53-4bf7-bd50-4754a418c60f_1280x1280.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Big Picture</strong></h3><p>Free college has become one of the signature promises of the Democratic left. Barack Obama proposed free community college nationally in 2015. Joe Biden tried again as president. Neither proposal became law.</p><p>The first state to actually do it was Tennessee, under a Republican governor and a Republican legislature.</p><p>In 2014, Governor Bill Haslam signed the Tennessee Promise Scholarship Act, offering every graduating high school senior tuition-free community or technical college. He sold it not as an entitlement but as workforce policy: Tennessee needed more workers with credentials beyond high school, and cost was keeping too many students from getting them. By 2024, 36 other states had followed with some version of free tuition.</p><p>A decade later, the evidence is in. <em><strong>A May 2026 working paper offers the first statewide estimate of Tennessee Promise&#8217;s effects: it raised college enrollment, increased associate&#8217;s degrees, did not pull students away from bachelor&#8217;s degrees, and likely pays for itself through higher future tax revenue.</strong></em></p><p>That is why Tennessee can serve as a Red State Lesson on higher education.</p><p>Democrats do not need to copy every feature of Tennessee&#8217;s model to take its challenge seriously.</p><p><em><strong>The task is to borrow Tennessee&#8217;s simplicity, support, and durable financing without importing the parts that screen out the students who need help most.</strong></em></p><h3><strong>The Tennessee Context</strong></h3><p>Before Promise, Tennessee had a college problem that looked like a price problem. But it wasn&#8217;t, not entirely.</p><p>In 2013, Governor Haslam launched the Drive to 55, a goal of having 55% of working-age Tennesseans hold a degree or certificate by 2025. When he introduced Promise the following year, only about 32% did.</p><p>The obvious culprit seemed to be cost. But for low-income students, community college was already close to free, because a full federal Pell Grant covered more than tuition at Tennessee&#8217;s community colleges. Many of those students still didn&#8217;t enroll. <em><strong>The barriers were information, paperwork, and timing</strong></em>: not knowing college was within reach, never filing the federal financial aid form, or drifting into a job after graduation and never coming back.</p><p>Tennessee also didn&#8217;t invent its model from scratch. The Ayers Foundation had paired scholarships with counselors in rural West Tennessee since 1999. A program called Knox Achieves launched in a single county in 2009, expanded as tnAchieves to 27 counties by 2012, and became the template for Promise. <em><strong>By the time free community college went statewide, the idea had already been tested.</strong></em></p><p><em><strong>The financing was deliberate as well</strong></em>. Rather than rely on annual appropriations, the state set aside $361 million in lottery reserves as a permanent endowment. Investment earnings and continued lottery transfers pay for the scholarships.</p><p>The politically visible reform was <em><strong>a price: free tuition.</strong></em> The more consequential reform was <em><strong>a pipeline</strong></em>: <em><strong>mentors, deadlines, and help with financial aid paperwork.</strong></em></p><h3><strong>How the Tennessee Model Works</strong></h3><p>Eligibility is simple. <em><strong>Any recent Tennessee high school graduate qualifies, with no income test and no GPA requirement.</strong></em> Students can use the scholarship at the state&#8217;s 13 community colleges and 23 colleges of applied technology for up to five semesters.</p><p>The scholarship is <em><strong>&#8220;last-dollar&#8221; aid, </strong></em>meaning it pays whatever tuition remains after other grants are applied. A student with no other aid gets all of community college tuition covered, roughly $4,500 a year. A student with the state&#8217;s HOPE scholarship ($3,200) gets the remaining $1,300 or so. A student with a full federal Pell Grant ($7,395) gets nothing from Promise, because Pell already exceeds tuition. The alternative, <em><strong>&#8220;first-dollar&#8221; aid</strong></em>, pays tuition first and lets students keep their Pell for books, rent, and transportation.</p><p>The last-dollar design keeps the program cheap: about $28 million a year in scholarships, or under $1,000 per student per year.<em><strong> The trade-off is that the money goes mostly to the students who need it least: the poorest students, </strong></em>whose Pell Grants already cover tuition, get the free-college message but little or no new money for what actually pushes them out of school, like books, rent, and transportation.</p><p>In exchange for Promise aid, students have to do more than show up. Students are required to:</p><ul><li><p>apply by November 1 of their senior year</p></li><li><p>file the federal financial aid form</p></li><li><p>attend a meeting with a mentor organization</p></li><li><p>complete eight hours of community service each term</p></li><li><p>enroll the fall after graduation</p></li><li><p>stay enrolled full time</p></li><li><p>keep a 2.0 GPA</p></li></ul><p>Two nonprofits, tnAchieves and the Ayers Foundation, run the mentoring. When the data showed that free tuition alone wasn&#8217;t enough, the state added more. <em><strong>Coaching came in 2018. In 2021, lawmakers funded completion grants of up to $1,000 a semester for food, housing, transportation, and books</strong></em>, then expanded them with $14.5 million the next year. Adults got their own version, <a href="https://tnreconnect.gov/">Tennessee Reconnect</a>, which now covers community and technical college for those 23 and older.</p><p><em><strong>The model&#8217;s most controversial features are its requirements and its last-dollar structure.</strong></em> Supporters argue the deadlines and full-time rule build momentum and keep students on track. Critics note that the requirements also screen students out: among applicants who enrolled in college without qualifying for Promise, about half lost eligibility over the community service hours alone. And because Pell covers tuition for the poorest students, most Promise dollars flow to families above the Pell line.</p><p>Tennessee&#8217;s model rests on the claim that <em><strong>Promise is less a scholarship than a structured on-ramp to college</strong></em>, and that the structure is the point.</p><h3><strong>What Tennessee Got Right</strong></h3><p>Tennessee made the state responsible for more than cutting a price.</p><ul><li><p><em><strong>It sent one simple message to every student.</strong></em> More than 90% of Tennessee high school seniors apply for Promise. Because there is no income test, no family has to wonder whether it qualifies, and no student is singled out as needy.</p></li></ul><ul><li><p><em><strong>It treated college-going as a pipeline the state manages.</strong></em> Financial aid forms, mentor meetings, and enrollment deadlines were built into senior year rather than left to families to figure out alone.</p></li></ul><ul><li><p><em><strong>It kept building when the evidence called for it.</strong></em> When data showed that low-income students, who rarely received Promise dollars, needed something other than tuition, the state added coaching and completion grants.</p></li></ul><ul><li><p><em><strong>It built financing meant to outlast any one governor.</strong></em> The endowment insulated Promise from annual budget fights, and the program has continued beyond Haslam&#8217;s tenure.</p></li></ul><ul><li><p><em><strong>It wrote evaluation into the law.</strong></em> The 2014 statute requires the state Comptroller&#8217;s office to review the program on a regular schedule, producing independent reports rather than press releases.</p></li></ul><p>This is a useful lesson for progressive policymakers, who sometimes treat a benefit&#8217;s generosity as the measure of its ambition. Tennessee&#8217;s per-student spending is modest. Its investment in the machinery around that spending is not.</p><p><em><strong>A price cut without support leaves students to fail on their own. Support without a clear promise never reaches them.</strong></em> Tennessee tried to build both.</p><h3><strong>What the Evidence Says (and Does Not Say)</strong></h3><p>On the outcomes Promise was designed to move, Tennessee produced real results.</p><p>The strongest evidence comes from a <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w35226/w35226.pdf">May 2026 National Bureau of Economic Research working paper</a> by economists at the University of Tennessee and elsewhere. <em><strong>It found that Promise raised college enrollment among 18- and 19-year-olds by 5.4 percentage points and increased associate&#8217;s degree attainment at age 21 by 2.9 points.</strong></em></p><p>Bachelor&#8217;s degree attainment did not fall either, which some had worried would happen when free tuition only applies to two-year schools. Instead, more students transferred from community colleges into four-year universities. Under reasonable assumptions about the value of a degree, the authors estimate<em><strong> the program pays for itself through higher future tax revenue.</strong></em></p><p>Those findings match earlier <a href="https://jhr.uwpress.org/node/15624">research on Knox Achieves</a>, Promise&#8217;s single-county predecessor, which raised the likelihood of earning an associate&#8217;s degree within nine years by 24%. The state&#8217;s own numbers, published in its <a href="https://comptroller.tn.gov/content/dam/cot/orea/advanced-search/2024/TNPromise2024Fullreport.pdf">Tennessee Promise Evaluation</a>, point the same way: <em><strong>college-going jumped from 58.6% to 64.4% in Promise&#8217;s first year.</strong></em></p><p>But attribution requires discipline.</p><p>The NBER study is a working paper that has not yet been peer-reviewed. The program&#8217;s descriptive statistics also flatter it. Thirty-seven percent of Promise students earn an associate&#8217;s degree within three years, compared with 11% of applicants who missed the requirements, but students who meet every deadline were likely more motivated to begin with.</p><p>Additionally, completion has been a weak spot in the program. Graduation rates at two-year colleges fell by about 6 points as more marginal students enrolled, even as the total number of degrees rose. And the equity record is mixed: <em><strong>only about a third of students who received Promise dollars were Pell-eligible, and Black applicants became Promise students at roughly half the rate of White applicants (18% versus 31%).</strong></em></p><p>This is not evidence that Promise failed. It is evidence that <em><strong>free tuition is an on-ramp, not a completion strategy.</strong></em></p><h3><strong>What to Borrow from the Tennessee Model</strong></h3><p>Policy designs and principles to borrow from Tennessee:</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>A universal, simple offer.</strong></em> One sentence every high school senior can understand, with no income test that makes families wonder whether they qualify.</p></li><li><p><em><strong>A state-run on-ramp. </strong></em>Help with financial aid forms, mentors, and clear deadlines, run by the state and its partners rather than left to families.</p></li><li><p><em><strong>Support after enrollment.</strong></em> Coaching and grants for the costs tuition doesn&#8217;t cover: books, rent, transportation, child care.</p></li><li><p><em><strong>Durable financing.</strong></em> An endowment or, at minimum, a statute, so the promise survives the next budget negotiation.</p></li><li><p><em><strong>Independent evaluation required by law.</strong></em> Track completion, transfer, and earnings, not just enrollment, and publish the results.</p></li></ol><h3><strong>A Democratic Model for Building on Tennessee</strong></h3><p>If Tennessee showed what a red state can build, <em><strong>Michigan has shown how a blue state can improve it.</strong></em></p><p>Under Governor Gretchen Whitmer (D), Michigan assembled an ambitious Democratic version of the Tennessee model: <em><strong><a href="https://www.michigan.gov/reconnect">Michigan Reconnect</a></strong></em>, launched in 2021 for adults, and the <em><strong><a href="https://www.michigan.gov/mistudentaid/programs/michigan-achievement-scholarship/community-college-guarantee">Community College Guarantee</a></strong></em>, created in 2024 for recent high school graduates.</p><p>Together, the two programs improve on Tennessee in three ways:</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>Put real dollars in low-income students&#8217; hands.</strong></em> Like Tennessee Promise, the Guarantee covers in-district tuition and mandatory fees with no income test. But unlike Promise, the Guarantee also gives Pell-eligible students a $1,000 bonus for books, transportation, and other costs. <em><strong>That is a direct answer to the last-dollar problem: the students Tennessee&#8217;s design passes over get new money, not just a message.</strong></em></p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><em><strong>Fund the people who help students finish.</strong></em> Michigan pairs Reconnect students with state &#8220;navigators&#8221; who help them enroll and stay on track, and it has awarded Student Success Grants to 44 of its 46 public and tribal colleges to raise graduation rates. It also puts colleges on the hook: to keep receiving full Reconnect payments, each school must show annual gains in its Reconnect students&#8217; completion rates. <em><strong>Tennessee holds students accountable for meeting deadlines; Michigan holds institutions accountable for results.</strong></em></p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><em><strong>Open the door to adults.</strong></em> Tennessee started with recent high school graduates and added adults later. Michigan built for adults from the start. Reconnect offers free in-district tuition to residents without a degree who are 25 and older (21 and older under this year&#8217;s budget) and allows part-time enrollment for students juggling work and family. The early returns are strong: about 20,000 Reconnect students have graduated, and a September 2026 state analysis found that their median wages rose by about $16,300 two years after graduation, enough for the state to recoup its investment through income taxes in roughly seven years.</p></li></ol><p>What Michigan hasn&#8217;t done is the fourth piece: <em><strong>lock in the money.</strong></em> This is where Michigan still trails Tennessee. Tennessee endowed its promise; Michigan funds Reconnect and the Guarantee through annual budgets.</p><p>Reconnect&#8217;s eligibility for 21- to 24-year-olds has already opened and closed once: a temporary expansion paid for with federal pandemic money ended in December 2024. Lawmakers lowered the age to 21 again in this year&#8217;s budget, but advocates warn the expansion may last only a year and are pushing to write it into statute.</p><p>Michigan&#8217;s lesson is that <em><strong>Democrats can make Tennessee&#8217;s model more generous, more accountable, and more open to adults.</strong></em> Its warning is that <em><strong>a promise renewed every budget cycle is only as durable as the next budget deal.</strong></em></p><h3><strong>Bottom Line</strong></h3><p>Tennessee did not make college free. For roughly half of its Promise students, it already was. <em><strong>It made college expected, and built a better road to get there.</strong></em></p><p>The state set a clear goal, sent every student the same simple message, paid for mentors and deadlines, endowed the money, and required independent evaluation. Free tuition was the headline. The system around it did the work.</p><p><em><strong>Democratic policymakers should be willing to learn from a Republican-led state that produced measurable gains. They should also improve on the model:</strong></em> put real dollars in low-income students&#8217; hands, fund the people who help students finish, open the door to adults, and lock in the money so the promise outlasts the politician who made it.</p><p>The lesson from Tennessee is <em><strong>not that college should be free. It is that a promise has to be built to be kept.</strong></em></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Maine Made Heat Pumps Mainstream. Getting Homes Off Oil Is Harder.]]></title><description><![CDATA[The country&#8217;s most oil-dependent state proved heat pumps work in the cold. Now it has to prove they can replace the furnace.]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/maine-made-heat-pumps-mainstream</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/maine-made-heat-pumps-mainstream</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 15:14:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!a5XP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec5b99ba-523c-4ef8-804d-9eee9a6caef5_1600x1000.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Big Picture</strong></h3><p>If you wanted to pick the hardest place in America to get people off fossil-fuel heat, you might pick Maine. It has long winters, some of the oldest housing in the country, and more households heating with oil than any other state.</p><p><em><strong>Maine is also where heat pumps went mainstream.</strong></em></p><p>In 2019, Governor Janet Mills signed a law setting a goal of 100,000 new heat pumps by 2025. The state hit it in July 2023, two years early, and Mills promptly set a bigger target: 175,000 more by 2027. Along the way, the share of Maine households that heat primarily with oil fell from 62% in 2018 to 50% in 2024, according to <a href="https://www.maine.gov/energy/sites/maine.gov.energy/files/inline-files/Maine%20Heating%20Fuel%20Reliance%20Data%202025.pdf">federal survey data cited by the state</a>.</p><p>Maine has answered the question most skeptics asked first: whether heat pumps work in a cold, poor, rural state. The next question is a harder one: <em><strong>Did Maine sell a lot of heat pumps, or did it get a lot of homes off oil?</strong></em> Those turn out to be different achievements.</p><h3><strong>Maine&#8217;s Heat Problem Was a Pocketbook Problem</strong></h3><p>Maine&#8217;s climate policy makes more sense once you see that it started as a fight over heating bills.</p><p>According to <a href="https://www.maine.gov/governor/mills/news/governor-mills-announces-reduction-heating-oil-reliance-maine-2025-09-30">state data</a>, Maine spends more than $4.5 billion a year on imported petroleum. Nearly all of it leaves the state, and Mainers have no say over what it costs. In September 2025, heating oil cost about <a href="https://www.maine.gov/future/sites/maine.gov.future/files/2025-12/MWW_2025_DIGITAL.pdf">$3.36</a> a gallon. By the end of March it was <a href="https://spectrumlocalnews.com/me/maine/news/2026/04/03/northern-maine-feels-pinch-of-heating-oil-price-spikes-from-iran-war">$5.37</a>, and this month it reached <a href="https://www.maine.gov/energy/sites/maine.gov.energy/files/inline-files/2025-2026%20Heating-Season-Weekly-Prices-10-05-2026.pdf">$5.97</a> amid the war with Iran. For a home burning about 640 gallons a year, that swing adds roughly $1,700 to the annual heating bill.</p><p><em><strong>Unsurprisingly, the burden falls hardest on low-income households.</strong></em> A 2024 study commissioned by the state&#8217;s Office of the Public Advocate found that low-income Mainers spend roughly 14% of their income on home energy, compared with about 5% for all households. Counting gasoline, low-income households spend <a href="https://www.maine.gov/future/sites/maine.gov.future/files/2025-12/MWW_2025_DIGITAL.pdf">about 30% of their income</a> on energy. And those that heat with oil spend <a href="https://www.maine.gov/governor/mills/news/governor-mills-announces-reduction-heating-oil-reliance-maine-2025-09-30">roughly twice as much</a> of their budget on energy as those that heat with electricity.</p><p>Heat pumps offered a way out. They swap an imported fuel whose price Maine can&#8217;t control for electricity that is increasingly renewable: <a href="https://www.maine.gov/future/sites/maine.gov.future/files/2025-12/MWW_2025_DIGITAL.pdf">55% of the electricity Maine used in 2024</a> came from renewable sources.</p><p>That is the context for everything that followed. <em><strong>Maine&#8217;s heat pump push was designed, and sold, as a cost-of-living policy. Emissions cuts came along with it.</strong></em></p><h3><strong>What Did Maine Actually Build?</strong></h3><p>Maine&#8217;s heat pump program came in four layers.</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>The Goal -</strong></em> In 2019, the Maine Legislature passed LD 1766 with <a href="https://www.maine.gov/governor/mills/news/governor-mills-signs-bill-promoting-energy-efficient-heat-pumps-maine-2019-06-14">bipartisan support</a> and it was signed into law by Governor Mills. LD 1766 set the goal of 100,000 heat pump installations (requiring at least 15,000 heat pumps in income-eligible homes), expanded rebates, and created a low-income heat pump program at the state housing authority, MaineHousing. The same session created the Maine Climate Council, whose plan, <em>Maine Won&#8217;t Wait</em>, set longer-range goals for 2030.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><em><strong>The Administrator -</strong></em> The rebates run through Efficiency Maine Trust, a quasi-state agency created by the Legislature. It is not a utility program and not a regular state department. It operates on three-year plans approved by the Public Utilities Commission, which gives contractors and homeowners an unusual degree of predictability. Its money comes from a mix of utility efficiency charges, proceeds from the regional carbon market (RGGI), electricity capacity-market revenue, and federal grants. <em><strong>Notably, it uses no general-fund tax dollars.</strong></em></p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><em><strong>The Rebate Design -</strong></em> Rebates are tiered by income: up to $3,000 for any homeowner and up to $9,000 for low-income households. But the most important rebate design choice came later. After initial implementation, Efficiency Maine&#8217;s own research found that many homeowners were installing one or two heat pumps and using them as supplements while the oil boiler kept heating the house. <em><strong>That undercut both savings and emissions cuts.</strong></em> So in 2023 the agency changed course and began paying rebates only for systems sized to heat the entire home.</p></li></ol><ol start="4"><li><p><em><strong>The Ratepayer Payoff -</strong> </em>The Beneficial Electrification Policy Act, enacted into law by Maine in 2023, lets Efficiency Maine spend ratepayer money on electrification when it lowers costs for the whole system. <em><strong>The logic: when more electricity is sold, especially off-peak, the fixed cost of poles and wires is spread across more kilowatt-hours, and rates fall for everyone.</strong></em> Efficiency Maine projects its current three-year plan will hold rates about $492 million below where they would otherwise be. This idea may be the most exportable thing Maine has done. It turns electrification from a cost that non-participants subsidize into a benefit that, at least on paper, they share.</p></li></ol><h3><strong>So, Is It Working?</strong></h3><p>By the Mills administration&#8217;s accounting, yes.</p><p>According to the Climate Council&#8217;s December 2025 report, Efficiency Maine and MaineHousing programs had installed 181,024 heat pumps since 2019, as of August 2025. The record year was fiscal 2025, with nearly 37,000 installs. In March 2026, Mills said the total had passed 200,000. As of August 2025, nearly 22,000 had gone into low and moderate-income homes, beating the law&#8217;s equity goal.</p><p>The strongest evidence isn&#8217;t the install count, though. It&#8217;s the oil data. A 12-point drop in the share of oil-heated homes in six years is a household-level outcome measured by federal surveys, not a program tally. <em><strong>That drop is hard to explain without real displacement of oil.</strong></em></p><h3><strong>Key Policy Takeaway: The Institution Did the Work</strong></h3><p>The 100,000 goal got the headlines. But a goal doesn&#8217;t install anything.</p><p><em><strong>What has made Maine&#8217;s policy work is the institution behind the goal:</strong></em> an administrator with stable, multi-year funding that doesn&#8217;t depend on an annual appropriations fight, a rebate structure that contractors could build a business around, and a willingness to change the program when its own data said it wasn&#8217;t delivering.</p><p>That contractor base didn&#8217;t appear on its own. <em><strong>The state built a workforce pipeline alongside the rebates, with heat pump training labs at community colleges, and nearly 700 installers are now registered with Efficiency Maine.</strong></em> Rebates create demand; trained installers are what turn it into installs.</p><p>The last point also deserves emphasis. Plenty of programs measure success by how much money goes out the door. Efficiency Maine looked at how heat pumps were actually being used, concluded that part of its program was underperforming, and redesigned it, accepting lower unit counts in exchange for deeper conversions.</p><p>A contrast with Massachusetts&#8217; heat pump program is instructive and shows why the structure matters. Massachusetts also beat its 2025 heat pump goal early, but its program, Mass Save, is run by the state&#8217;s utilities. When regulators cut $500 million from its proposed budget in 2025, the utilities&#8217; revised plan aimed its largest proposed cuts at heat pump incentives ($220 million). Installations there fell that year, while Efficiency Maine posted its best year on record.</p><h3><strong>The Turn: Units Aren&#8217;t Homes</strong></h3><p>Here is the complication. The goals Maine have celebrated thus far only count heat pump units. <em><strong>The goals that matter for oil use and emissions must count homes.</strong></em></p><p>A typical Maine home needs about three units to heat it fully. So 200,000 heat pumps represent far fewer whole-home conversions. The climate plan&#8217;s targets include 130,000 homes partly heated by heat pumps and 115,000 homes fully heated by them, both by 2030.</p><p>The state&#8217;s own December 2025 report is candid about where those stand. The partial-home goal will likely be met by 2027, largely through installs that happen without incentives. The whole-home goal will require a significant ramp-up by 2030, and more funding than the current three-year plan provides. Even the unit goal is now a stretch. Reaching 275,000 by the end of 2027 from the August 2025 count requires roughly 40,000 installs a year. That&#8217;s more than Maine has ever done in a year, and it would have to happen after the federal tax credits disappeared.</p><p><em><strong>The deeper vulnerability is price.</strong></em> Heat pumps save money because electricity is cheaper than oil for the same heat. When Efficiency Maine ran the numbers in September 2025, with oil at $3.36 a gallon, a home converted from oil saved about $413 a year. At this month&#8217;s prices ($5.97 a gallon for oil in the state&#8217;s <a href="https://www.maine.gov/energy/sites/maine.gov.energy/files/inline-files/2025-2026%20Heating-Season-Weekly-Prices-10-05-2026.pdf">Oct. 5 survey</a>, and <a href="https://www.maine.gov/energy/electricity-prices">24 to 31 cents per kilowatt-hour</a> for electricity, depending on the utility), the same home would save roughly $1,700 to $2,200 a year, by Blue Laboratories&#8217; calculation using <a href="https://www.maine.gov/future/sites/maine.gov.future/files/2025-12/MWW_2025_DIGITAL.pdf">Efficiency Maine&#8217;s example</a>. Meanwhile, Maine&#8217;s electricity prices have risen at the third-fastest rate in the nation over the past decade.</p><p>This winter&#8217;s oil spike has multiplied that advantage four- to fivefold. <em><strong>But a policy whose value depends on world oil prices staying high is standing on a moving floor.</strong></em></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!a5XP!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec5b99ba-523c-4ef8-804d-9eee9a6caef5_1600x1000.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!a5XP!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec5b99ba-523c-4ef8-804d-9eee9a6caef5_1600x1000.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!a5XP!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec5b99ba-523c-4ef8-804d-9eee9a6caef5_1600x1000.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!a5XP!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec5b99ba-523c-4ef8-804d-9eee9a6caef5_1600x1000.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!a5XP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec5b99ba-523c-4ef8-804d-9eee9a6caef5_1600x1000.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!a5XP!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec5b99ba-523c-4ef8-804d-9eee9a6caef5_1600x1000.png" width="1456" height="910" 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20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><em><strong>There&#8217;s an equity question, too.</strong></em> Whole-home systems cost more up front, and some have opposed the state&#8217;s shift to whole-home rebates on the grounds that affluent homeowners and developers would capture the benefits. Efficiency Maine counters that its income tiers were designed to prevent that. The results are mixed: low-income adoption has grown, to about 13% of low-income homeowners, but the 2030 goal of 40,000 heat pumps in low-income homes was still less than halfway met as of August 2025.</p><h3><strong>The Politics of Heat Pumps</strong></h3><p>If the policy lesson is about institutions, the political lesson is about framing.</p><p>Maine&#8217;s heat pump law passed with <a href="https://www.maine.gov/governor/mills/news/governor-mills-signs-bill-promoting-energy-efficient-heat-pumps-maine-2019-06-14">bipartisan support</a>, and the ratepayer-funded efficiency model predates Mills. Her pitch has consistently led with savings, comfort and energy independence, and only then climate.</p><p><em><strong>The result is a climate program with no organized partisan opposition.</strong></em> The fuel-dealer industry fought specific rules, like the disconnect requirement, but <em><strong>no major political force has campaigned against heat pumps themselves.</strong></em></p><p>What happens next depends on the governor&#8217;s race. Democrat Hannah Pingree co-chaired the Climate Council as Mills&#8217;s policy director and has said she would continue the plan. Independent Rick Bennett also supports it. Republican Bobby Charles has made energy affordability his top issue and wants an all-of-the-above approach that includes new natural gas pipelines. Notably, he has blamed solar incentives, not heat pumps, for higher electricity costs.</p><p><em><strong>The risk to the program isn&#8217;t a direct attack. It&#8217;s that the money funding it, carbon-market proceeds and charges on electric bills, becomes a target in a campaign about electricity rates.</strong></em> With the Legislature closely divided and every seat on the ballot, that&#8217;s a real possibility in 2027.</p><h3><strong>The Blueprint for Other States</strong></h3><p>Maine&#8217;s experience offers five lessons.</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>Build an institution, not just a goal.</strong></em> Targets generate press releases. A trusted administrator, a contractor network and a stable rebate structure generate installs.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><em><strong>Fund it off-budget and multi-year.</strong> </em>Efficiency Maine&#8217;s ratepayer and carbon-market funding, approved in three-year plans, let contractors plan around it. Programs that live or die in annual budgets can&#8217;t offer that stability.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><em><strong>Count homes, not units.</strong></em> A unit target is easy to beat and easy to celebrate. The measure that tracks oil use and emissions is the number of homes that stop burning fossil fuels. Maine&#8217;s <a href="https://www.maine.gov/future/sites/maine.gov.future/files/2025-12/MWW_2025_DIGITAL.pdf">climate dashboard</a> reports heat pump units and low-income installs, but not how many homes have fully converted. Publishing that number, and setting goals against it, is the clearest next step for Maine and the easiest for other states to copy.</p></li></ol><ol start="4"><li><p><em><strong>Redesign when the data says to.</strong></em> Maine&#8217;s shift to whole-home rebates cost it easy numbers and bought it real conversions. That willingness to change course is rarer than it should be.</p></li></ol><ol start="5"><li><p><em><strong>Sell it as a bill, and protect the bill.</strong></em> Maine won bipartisan support by framing heat pumps as savings. That only holds if electricity stays affordable, which means a heat pump strategy is also an electricity-rate strategy.</p></li></ol><h3><strong>Bottom Line</strong></h3><p>Maine has done something most states only promise. It took the most oil-dependent housing stock in the country and <em><strong>made heat pumps an ordinary purchase</strong></em>, with bipartisan support and without general-fund dollars.</p><p>Mills and Efficiency Maine deserve credit for treating delivery as the hard part. But the easy half is done.</p><p>The goal Maine beat counted machines; the goal that matters counts homes.</p><p>Maine proved heat pumps work in the cold. It&#8217;s up to the next governor and legislature to prove a state can move most of its homes off oil.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Washington Didn't Copy Oregon's Original Rent Cap Policy. It Copied the Fix.]]></title><description><![CDATA[Oregon's formula failed under inflation in 2023. Washington adopted the repaired version and added tools of its own.]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/washington-didnt-copy-oregons-original</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/washington-didnt-copy-oregons-original</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 13:07:02 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>Big Picture</strong></h2><p>Washington did not invent its rent cap. It borrowed one from a neighbor.</p><p>In 2025, Washington became the third state with a statewide rent cap, after Oregon and California. <em><strong>Its formula came almost word for word from Oregon: increases for sitting tenants are capped at 7% plus inflation, never more than 10%. </strong></em>For 2027, renters in both states face the same 10% limit.</p><p>That makes Oregon, which passed the nation&#8217;s first statewide cap in 2019, a six-year preview &#8211; and that record is more interesting than either side of the debate predicted.</p><p><em><strong>Oregon and Washington&#8217;s caps are not rent control in the classic sense.</strong></em> In cities like San Francisco, rent control limits increases to a fraction of inflation and covers a unit no matter who lives in it. Oregon and Washington cap only increases for sitting tenants &#8211; landlords may reset to market rent when a unit turns over, and newer buildings are exempt entirely.</p><p>The cap, 7% plus inflation, sits well above what most landlords were charging anyway. Yet the first peer-reviewed study of Oregon&#8217;s law found that <em><strong>rents in covered buildings grew more slowly and tenants moved far less, even though the cap almost never forced a landlord&#8217;s hand. </strong></em>What Oregon can&#8217;t tell us is the cost: whether the cap discourages building or pushes rentals off the market.</p><p>Washington copied Oregon&#8217;s formula but changed the terms around it: a shorter exemption for new buildings, an attorney general who enforces the law, and an expiration date. Each change tests a question Oregon left open.</p><h2><strong>How Oregon &amp; Washington Got Here</strong></h2><p>Oregon moved first, and then had to fix what it built.</p><p>In 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 608, championed by then-House Speaker Tina Kotek (D). It capped annual rent increases at 7% plus inflation, exempted buildings less than 15 years old, and barred no-cause evictions after a tenant&#8217;s first year. Supporters called it an anti-gouging law. Tenant groups backed it begrudgingly because it was the best they could get.</p><p>For three years the formula produced caps just under 10%, and few people noticed. <em><strong>Then inflation hit. The formula allowed rent increases of up to 14.6% for 2023</strong></em> &#8211; tenants described the notices that followed as eviction letters. That summer, lawmakers passed SB 611, which kept the formula but added <em><strong>a hard ceiling of 10%</strong></em>. It passed the House 32&#8211;18, and now-Governor Kotek signed it.</p><p><em><strong>Washington started from a tougher position and ended up in the same place.</strong></em> The House version of HB 1217 proposed a flat 7% cap. The Senate pushed it toward 10% plus inflation. On the last day of session, a conference committee settled on Oregon&#8217;s revised formula. It passed 54&#8211;44 in the House and 27&#8211;20 in the Senate, with no Republican votes and several Democrats opposed.</p><p>In other words, Washington did not copy Oregon&#8217;s 2019 law. It copied the version Oregon wrote after its formula failed under inflation.</p><h2><strong>What Do the Laws Do?</strong></h2><p>Both laws do three things.</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>They cap increases for sitting tenants, not rents.</strong></em> Each year the state publishes a maximum increase: 7% plus inflation, up to 10%. Landlords may set any rent when a unit turns over, and neither state allows an increase in a tenant&#8217;s first year. Increases require 90 days&#8217; notice.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><em><strong>They exempt new buildings on a rolling basis.</strong></em> Oregon exempts buildings for 15 years, Washington for 12. Each year, another year&#8217;s worth of buildings ages into coverage. The exemption is meant to protect construction: a developer knows a new building will not face the cap for over a decade.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><em><strong>They treat manufactured-home parks separately.</strong></em> Washington caps lot rents at 5% a year, with no sunset. Oregon, starting in 2026, caps lot rents at 6% for parks with more than 30 spaces.</p></li></ol><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png" width="1256" height="354" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!4e2i!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7cca3078-ae06-45db-ae94-c76809e7e164_1256x354.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><em><strong>Notably, the laws differ most in who enforces them and how.</strong></em> In Oregon, enforcement falls to tenants: a renter hit with an illegal increase can sue the landlord for three months&#8217; rent plus damages. Washington gives tenants a similar right but also puts the law under the state Consumer Protection Act, so the attorney general can sue and seek penalties of up to $7,500 per violation.</p><p><em><strong>That difference matters because the people a rent cap protects are the least likely to sue. </strong></em>A tenant may not know the cap exists, may not be able to afford a lawyer, and may fear the landlord won&#8217;t renew the lease. An attorney general can act on a pattern across a whole building or park, as Washington&#8217;s did in winning rent relief for more than 1,000 households in the law&#8217;s first year.</p><h2><strong>Key Policy Takeaway &#8212; A Cap That Rarely Binds Still Changes Behavior</strong></h2><p>On paper, Oregon&#8217;s cap should barely matter. A cap only &#8220;binds&#8221; when it actually stops a landlord from raising rent as much as they otherwise would.</p><p>Before 2019, no part of Oregon saw average rents grow anywhere near the roughly 10% a year the formula allowed. The fastest-growing areas averaged about 7%. <em><strong>A cap set above the market is usually a cap in name only.</strong></em></p><p>However, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1051137726000434">a recent study published in July in the </a><em><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1051137726000434">Journal of Housing Economics</a></em> found otherwise. Using survey data on more than 580,000 Oregon households, the study compared tenants in buildings old enough to be covered with those in newer, exempt buildings, before and after the law.</p><p>The results:</p><ul><li><p><em><strong>Rents grew more slowly.</strong></em> Rents in covered buildings rose about 4.6% less than in exempt ones. In two- and three-bedroom units, which house 71% of Oregon renters, the gap was 9% to 10%.</p></li><li><p><em><strong>Tenants moved less.</strong></em> Renters in covered buildings became far less likely to move. Even the study&#8217;s most conservative estimate puts the drop at roughly 19% to 27%, and the effect grew over time.</p></li><li><p><em><strong>Ownership shifted.</strong></em> Households in covered urban buildings became about 8% more likely to own.</p></li></ul><p><em><strong>The study&#8217;s reading is that landlords and tenants respond to the existence of a cap, not only to its limit.</strong></em> Landlords may hold increases below the ceiling to avoid scrutiny or future tightening. Tenants may stay because they expect protection.</p><p><em><strong>That cuts against both sides of the political debate.</strong></em> For tenant advocates, a &#8220;weak&#8221; cap turns out to have teeth. For critics, the effects they worried about (tenants locked into below-market units and rentals converted to condos) may show up even when the cap looks harmless.</p><h2><strong>So, Is It Working?</strong></h2><p>It depends on what the cap is supposed to do.</p><ul><li><p><em><strong>Stopping rent shocks: yes.</strong></em> Since SB 611, no Oregon tenant in a covered unit has faced a legal increase above 10%. In 2023, before the ceiling, the formula allowed 14.6%.</p></li></ul><ul><li><p><em><strong>Keeping tenants housed: probably, but the evidence can&#8217;t say how.</strong></em> The drop in moving is the study&#8217;s strongest and most consistent finding. But the data cannot tell a family spared a forced move from a tenant staying put to keep a below-market rent. The first is the law&#8217;s goal. The second is what economists call &#8220;lock-in,&#8221; and it can make it harder for new renters to find a place.</p></li></ul><ul><li><p><em><strong>Enforcement: visible in Washington, largely invisible in Oregon.</strong></em> As noted above, in its first year, Washington&#8217;s attorney general settled about four dozen alleged violations. Fines topped $800,000, and more than 1,000 households received rent relief, though none of the fines had been collected as of May. Oregon has no comparable public tally.</p></li></ul><ul><li><p><em><strong>Housing supply: unknown.</strong></em> Apartment permits have collapsed in both metros. In the Seattle area they fell to about 21 units per 10,000 residents in the year ending March 2025, half the 2020&#8211;23 pace, before Washington&#8217;s cap took effect. Portland&#8217;s construction has fallen even more steeply. Interest rates, building costs, a tech slowdown and Portland&#8217;s inclusionary-zoning rules all play a part. <em><strong>No study has isolated the role of either state&#8217;s cap.</strong></em></p></li></ul><p>The study mentioned above also notes one caution about supply. The rise in homeownership in older buildings could mean renters buying their homes. It could also mean landlords selling or converting rentals. The data cannot tell which.</p><h2><strong>The Strongest Critique Comes From Both Sides</strong></h2><p>Rent caps draw fire from the right and the left, and Oregon&#8217;s record gives each side some ammunition.</p><p><em><strong>From landlords and economists, the worry is supply.</strong></em> The Rental Housing Association of Washington has warned that owners are leaving the market and &#8220;the outflow will continue to accelerate.&#8221; The broader research supports some caution. In San Francisco, a stricter rent control expansion kept tenants in place but led landlords to convert buildings and cut rental supply by 15%. The aforementioned study&#8217;s lock-in finding fits that pattern: fewer moves mean fewer openings for newcomers, and rising ownership in older buildings may signal conversions.</p><p><em><strong>From tenant advocates, the worry is that the cap is too weak.</strong></em> Rents reset between tenants, so a landlord who wants a market rent can wait for turnover. Buildings stay exempt for 12 to 15 years, often the newest units with the steepest rents. And 10% a year is still steep for a household whose pay rises 3%.</p><p>Both critiques can be true at once: a cap can be too loose to protect many renters and still tight enough to change who moves and who sells.</p><h2><strong>Same Formula, Different Bets</strong></h2><p>The two states share a formula, but Washington made four bets Oregon did not. Each one is a test other states can learn from.</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>A shorter exemption.</strong></em> Washington&#8217;s 12-year window brings buildings into coverage three years sooner. If construction holds up in Washington relative to Oregon, that weakens the argument that a long exemption is needed to protect building.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><em><strong>An enforcer with teeth.</strong></em> Washington&#8217;s attorney general has already used the law against noncompliant landlords. Oregon leaves enforcement largely to tenants, a slower and less visible route. If Washington&#8217;s cap shows larger effects, enforcement may be the reason.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><em><strong>An expiration date.</strong></em> Washington&#8217;s cap expires in 2040 unless lawmakers renew it. That forces a reckoning Oregon never has to face, but it also gives landlords a reason to wait the law out.</p></li></ol><ol start="4"><li><p><em><strong>A tighter cap on manufactured-home lots.</strong></em> Washington chose 5% with no sunset. Oregon chose 6%, only for larger parks. The Spokane lawsuit may decide whether Washington&#8217;s version survives.</p></li></ol><p>One thing travels without a bet. <em><strong>The rolling exemption that made Oregon&#8217;s law measurable works the same way in Washington.</strong></em> Every year, a new year&#8217;s worth of buildings ages into coverage, giving researchers a natural experiment.</p><h2><strong>The Blueprint for Other States</strong></h2><p>Oregon and Washington point to five policy design lessons.</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>Build the data into the law.</strong></em> Neither state tracks rents on covered units. A simple rent registry or required reporting would let lawmakers measure the cap instead of arguing about it.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><em><strong>Set a hard ceiling, not just a formula.</strong></em> Oregon&#8217;s inflation-linked formula allowed 14.6% when tenants could least afford it. A fixed ceiling, as both states now have, is what protects renters in an inflation spike.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><em><strong>Protect new construction with a rolling exemption.</strong></em> A fixed window for new buildings reassures developers, and it gives researchers a clean comparison group.</p></li></ol><ol start="4"><li><p><em><strong>Give the law an enforcer.</strong></em> A cap tenants must enforce themselves will be unevenly enforced. Washington&#8217;s attorney general model, with penalties, makes compliance more likely.</p></li></ol><ol start="5"><li><p><em><strong>Treat manufactured-home parks as a separate problem.</strong></em> Lot-rent caps protect some of the most vulnerable renters, but a cap with no hardship valve invites lawsuits and park sales. Pair it with a review process for documented cost spikes and support for resident purchases of parks.</p></li></ol><h2><strong>Bottom Line</strong></h2><p>Oregon showed that a statewide rent cap is politically durable. It has survived six years, an inflation shock and a rewrite. It has also shown that a cap doesn&#8217;t have to bind to matter: <em><strong>set above what most landlords were charging,</strong></em> <em><strong>Oregon&#8217;s cap still slowed rent growth and kept tenants in place.</strong></em></p><p>Washington is now running the same experiment with sharper tools: <em><strong>a shorter exemption, an attorney general to enforce it and a deadline to judge whether it worked.</strong></em> Its first real test comes in 2027, the first full year its cap sits at the 10% ceiling.</p><p>Oregon wrote the rent cap. Whether Washington proves it works will depend less on the 10% limit than on the parts around it: who enforces it, and whether anyone measures what it does to renters, landlords and new housing.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[New Mexico Made Child Care Free. Making it Last is Harder]]></title><description><![CDATA[The first universal child-care law shows a state can remove the price barrier entirely. But sustainably paying for it and staffing it remain challenges.]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/new-mexico-made-child-care-free-making</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/new-mexico-made-child-care-free-making</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 13:36:44 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RFAI!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5fb28aea-6d53-4bf7-bd50-4754a418c60f_1280x1280.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>Big Picture</strong></h2><p>When we looked at Vermont&#8217;s Act 76, the lesson was that a state can make child care affordable faster than it can make it available. New Mexico has now run the more extreme version of that experiment.</p><p>On November 1, 2025, New Mexico stopped asking families how much they earn before paying for their child care. <em><strong>Any family that works or attends school can now get state-paid care for children from birth to age 13, with no income test and, for nearly everyone, no copay.</strong></em> In March, the Legislature codified the program into permanent law.</p><p>Eleven months later, the results look a lot like Vermont&#8217;s, only faster.</p><p>Enrollment rose from roughly 32,000 children to about 47,000, according to state figures. Providers report waiting lists in the hundreds. And the bill arrived ahead of the forecasts, along with a legislative fight, a dismissed lawsuit, and two whistleblower complaints from inside the agency running the program.</p><p>New Mexico&#8217;s experiment shows that <em><strong>a state can administer universal child care.</strong></em> It does not yet show that other states can afford to. <em><strong>New Mexico is paying for universality with an $11 billion endowment built from oil and gas revenue&#8212;a resource almost no other state has.</strong></em></p><p>So the answer to our &#8220;Can it scale?&#8221; question is twofold. The financing mostly doesn&#8217;t travel but the architecture around it does.</p><h2><strong>How New Mexico Got Here</strong></h2><p>New Mexico&#8217;s child-care problem is familiar: care costs too much for parents and pays too little to keep workers.</p><p>The state&#8217;s answer, unusually, was institutional before it was budgetary. In 2019, it created a cabinet-level Early Childhood Education and Care Department (ECECD) to run child care, pre-K, home visiting and early intervention as one system.</p><p>Next came the money. In 2020, lawmakers created the Early Childhood Education and Care Fund. When oil and gas revenue runs above its five-year average and state reserves are full, the surplus flows into the fund. <em><strong>The Permian Basin boom turned that mechanism into a fortune: the fund held about $11 billion by the end of 2025.</strong></em> In 2022, roughly 70% of voters also approved a constitutional amendment drawing more from the state&#8217;s Land Grant Permanent Fund, adding about $150 million a year for early childhood.</p><p>Eligibility widened as the money arrived.</p><p>Between 2019 and 2023, the income limit for child-care assistance rose from 200% of the federal poverty level to 400%, and the state waived most copays. By 2025, about 80% of New Mexico households with children already qualified.</p><p>That context matters for the scaling question. <em><strong>Removing the income test in 2025 did not create a new program. It removed the last fence around an existing one</strong></em>&#8212;bringing roughly 25,000 more children into eligibility, by the department&#8217;s estimate.</p><h2><strong>What Does SB 241 Do?</strong></h2><p>Senate Bill 241, the Child Care Assistance Program Act, passed the State Senate 25&#8211;15 and the State House 37&#8211;19 on a party-line vote; Governor Lujan Grisham signed it on March 10, 2026.</p><p>The law does three things.</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>It makes universality permanent.</strong></em> Children from birth to 13 qualify if their families work or attend school, with no income cap. Families earning up to 600% of the federal poverty level pay nothing. Families above that line can be charged a sliding-scale copay, but only if specific triggers hit&#8212;high inflation, an enrollment surge, or falling oil prices&#8212;and only with 90 days&#8217; notice.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><em><strong>It builds in a brake.</strong></em> If money or enrollment runs ahead of plan, the department may open a waiting list. Children with disabilities or developmental delays, and families the state considers at-risk, go to the front. The department must report who is on that list, and their incomes, to legislative committees twice a year.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><em><strong>It pays for the transition.</strong></em> Lawmakers may draw up to $700 million from the endowment&#8217;s principal through fiscal 2031, on top of its regular annual distribution of at least $500 million. That draw stops if the fund would fall below $10 billion. The House cut the authorization from $1 billion after budget staff and the State Investment Council warned about the fund&#8217;s long-term health.</p></li></ol><p>Importantly, the law also addresses the provider side. Payment rates must come from a cost-estimation model, tiered by quality, that reflects &#8220;adequate wages&#8221; for staff. Providers that accept the state&#8217;s enhanced rates commit to a wage floor of $18 an hour. A companion bill, SB 96, bars cities, counties and homeowners&#8217; associations from zoning out home-based child care.</p><h2><strong>Key Policy Takeaway &#8212; Demand Moved First</strong></h2><p><em><strong>The clearest outcome, as in Vermont, is participation.</strong></em></p><p>The state served about 32,900 children in September 2025. By late March 2026, the department had found 18,099 newly eligible children from 13,624 families. By this September, enrollment was about 47,000. For families who get a slot, the savings are large: roughly $12,000 to $14,000 a year per child, depending on the estimate.</p><p>The harder question is who those new families are. That is the trade-off at the heart of going universal.</p><p>The department&#8217;s answer is that most were not wealthy newcomers. <em><strong>Through March 26, 54% of newly enrolled families earned less than 400% of the poverty level</strong></em>&#8212;meaning they had already qualified for help and simply had not used it. One plausible reading is that a program for everyone is simpler to apply for and easier to hear about than one for the poor.</p><p>However, the Legislative Finance Committee (LFC), the Legislature&#8217;s budget staff, reads the same data differently. About 42% of new families earned above the old cap; an earlier LFC snapshot put the share at 62.5%. In December, the LFC warned that the state would &#8220;supplant many private pay families with the state as the payer&#8221; rather than create new care. It also noted that the lowest-income children&#8217;s share of the caseload had already fallen from 60% in 2019 to 30% in 2025 as eligibility widened.</p><p>Both readings can be true. <em><strong>In a market with spare capacity, universality is mostly a transfer to families who were already paying. In a market without it, those families compete for the same scarce slots as the families the subsidy was built for.</strong></em></p><p><em><strong>New Mexico is the second kind of market. </strong></em>A state-commissioned analysis found the state short about 15,700 slots for children under 6, including roughly 12,400 for infants and toddlers. Yet, there is one encouraging sign on targeting. Infants and toddlers, the hardest and most expensive care to supply, were 29% of the caseload before the expansion but 39% of new enrollments after it.</p><p>The LFC had worried the youngest children would lose ground. So far, they haven&#8217;t.</p><h2><strong>So, Is It Working?</strong></h2><p>It depends which part of the system you measure.</p><ul><li><p><em><strong>Affordability: yes, for families who find a slot.</strong></em> A family that was paying $1,000 to $2,000 a month now pays nothing. For a young family, that can be the single largest cost-of-living cut government can offer.</p></li></ul><ul><li><p><em><strong>Supply: growing, but not at the speed of demand.</strong></em> New Mexico&#8217;s supply was expanding before universality. Licensed capacity grew about 20% from 2019 to 2025, to roughly 71,500 slots. The state&#8217;s child-care workforce grew 64% from 2019 to 2024 while the national workforce shrank, and median wages rose 65%, the steepest increase in the country, according to the department. Since launch, the state says about 6,700 slots have been added.</p></li></ul><ul><li><p><em><strong>Outcomes: unknown.</strong></em> The state can count children, providers, slots and dollars. It cannot yet say whether more parents are working, whether children are better prepared for school, or whether provider wages will hold. The LFC has said research &#8220;has not demonstrated a causal or correlative link&#8221; between the state&#8217;s child-care assistance and better educational outcomes.</p></li></ul><p>As with Vermont, plausible benefits should not be reported as measured ones.</p><h2><strong>The Strongest Critique Is About Execution and Money</strong></h2><p>New Mexico&#8217;s early record calls for even more humility than Vermont&#8217;s.</p><p><em><strong>The first problem was sequencing.</strong></em> Vermont legislated, phased in provider rate increases, then expanded eligibility. New Mexico expanded eligibility first and legislated afterward. &#8220;We&#8217;re building a rocket ship as we fly it,&#8221; the governor told <em>The Washington Post</em>. Rocket ships built that way tend to run over budget.</p><p>This one did. Enrollment &#8220;scaled faster than initially projected,&#8221; legislative staff said, and by May the LFC&#8217;s director estimated the program could overspend by about $50 million in its first year. The state covered part of the gap with $28.7 million in federal funds. Reported estimates of the shortfall now range from $50 million to $83 million, depending on who is counting and over what period.</p><p><em><strong>The second problem is accountability.</strong></em> Two former senior finance officials at the department have filed whistleblower lawsuits. The former chief financial officer alleges an $83 million shortfall and money moved between programs without required approval. The former budget director alleges she was fired after flagging a $258 million gap for fiscal 2027. The department calls the allegations &#8220;manufactured and unfounded,&#8221; and no court has ruled on them. Separately, a judge dismissed a lawsuit claiming the program had skipped required rulemaking, finding the issue moot once SB 241 passed; the plaintiffs, including Republican candidates, have said they will appeal.</p><p>None of that proves mismanagement. <em><strong>But a program that depends on public trust in its forecasts cannot afford a dispute over whether its forecasts were honest.</strong></em></p><p><em><strong>The third problem is the one the law only postpones.</strong></em> In December 2025, the LFC estimated universal care could cost about $850 million a year at full uptake, more than double the pre-expansion budget. Its review of SB 241 projects a gap of $340 million to $400 million a year by the end of fiscal 2029, with no new recurring revenue to cover it. The $700 million draw buys time. It is not a funding source. And the endowment it draws from is filled by a commodity that New Mexico does not control.</p><p>Defenders have real answers. The fund is large, the draw is capped by a $10 billion floor, and the law includes copay and waitlist triggers so the state can respond to a downturn by law rather than by emergency. <em><strong>New Mexico has planned for bad news. It has not yet had to use the plan.</strong></em></p><h2><strong>Can It Scale?</strong></h2><p><a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/nearly-two-thirds-of-governors-prioritize-child-care-and-early-learning-in-their-2026-state-of-the-state-addresses/">Governors in nearly two-thirds of states talked about child care</a> in their 2026 State of the State addresses. All of them are now watching New Mexico.</p><p>The answer to whether its model travels has four parts.</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>The revenue source mostly doesn&#8217;t.</strong></em> Oil and gas supply 25% to 30% of New Mexico&#8217;s general fund, and few states have a resource windfall large enough to endow a social program. What does travel is the principle: <em><strong>child care needs dedicated, protected revenue that outlasts any single budget</strong></em>&#8212;an endowment, a payroll contribution like Vermont&#8217;s, or an earmarked tax.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><em><strong>The supply tools do, slowly.</strong></em> A cost-based rate model, a wage floor, facility loans and zoning protection for home-based providers are all copyable. None of them work as fast as a price cut.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><em><strong>Targeting is a choice.</strong></em> A state can make every family eligible while keeping a priority line for the children with the most to gain. SB 241 now allows exactly that. Other states may opt to stop short of New Mexico, at a high income cap like Vermont&#8217;s 575% of poverty, and spend the difference on supply.</p></li></ol><ol start="4"><li><p><em><strong>The rollout is a cautionary tale.</strong></em> New Mexico underestimated how many eligible families would sign up once the program was simple and free. Vermont overestimated its payroll revenue. A state copying either should forecast uptake high and revenue low.</p></li></ol><h2><strong>The Blueprint for Other States</strong></h2><p>New Mexico&#8217;s experience points to five policy design lessons.</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>Build the fund before you promise the benefit.</strong></em> New Mexico spent five years accumulating the endowment that now carries the program. A state without that runway should expand eligibility only as fast as its dedicated revenue grows.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><em><strong>Fund supply before, or with, eligibility.</strong></em> A price cut fills existing slots in weeks. New slots take years. Rate increases, wage floors and capacity grants should lead the expansion, as they did in Vermont.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><em><strong>Forecast uptake high.</strong></em> Simplicity and universality bring in eligible families who never applied before &#8211; budget for that.</p></li></ol><ol start="4"><li><p><em><strong>Write the brakes into law on day one.</strong></em> Copay triggers, a priority waitlist and a fund floor are better adopted calmly than in a deficit.</p></li></ol><ol start="5"><li><p><em><strong>Keep a priority line under universality</strong></em><strong>.</strong> Universal eligibility is good politics. When slots are scarce, it still needs a rule for who goes first.</p></li></ol><h2><strong>Bottom Line</strong></h2><p>Vermont showed that a state can pay to make child care affordable. <em><strong>New Mexico has shown that a state can make it universal&#8212;and that universality is administrable, popular enough to codify, and expensive in ways forecasts underestimate.</strong></em></p><p>Neither state has yet shown it can make care available to every family that wants it. That remains the hard part.</p><p>For other states, the New Mexico lesson is the same one Vermont taught, but stated more sharply. <em><strong>Removing the price barrier is the easy part. The real test is whether a state can keep paying for it, and whether a parent can find &#8211; not just afford &#8211; a place for their child.</strong></em></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[What Pennsylvania's Permitting Reforms Can Teach Other States, and What They Shouldn't Copy]]></title><description><![CDATA[Governor Josh Shapiro&#8217;s permitting reforms offer Democrats a credible model for making government work, and a warning that speed without legitimacy doesn&#8217;t hold.]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/what-pennsylvanias-permitting-reforms</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/what-pennsylvanias-permitting-reforms</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 13:47:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RFAI!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5fb28aea-6d53-4bf7-bd50-4754a418c60f_1280x1280.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Big Picture</strong></h3><p>When Governor Josh Shapiro took office in 2023, Pennsylvania had a reputation few governors would want: a state where projects went to wait.</p><p>By late 2023, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) counted a backlog of more than 2,400 permit applications. Applicants often couldn&#8217;t tell where their permit stood, how long it would take, or whom to call.</p><p><em><strong>Shapiro made fixing that a signature agenda item.</strong></em></p><p>In his first month, he ordered every state agency to catalog its permits and commit to a processing deadline. Over the next three years, his administration and a divided legislature added a money-back guarantee, a paid third-party review option, a concierge program for major projects, and statutory deadlines after which some environmental permits are approved automatically.</p><p><em><strong>&#8220;Government at the speed of business&#8221; became a slogan, then a record, and eventually a national brand.</strong></em> DEP says the backlog hit zero in October 2025, and the administration says average processing time fell from 53 days in 2022 to 38 days in 2025. Then, in August 2026, Shapiro pulled data centers, the most visible projects his reforms had courted, out of his own Fast Track program.</p><p>Pennsylvania has shown that <em><strong>Democratic leadership can make the permitting bureaucracy measurably faster.</strong></em> It has also shown that faster was never the only thing people wanted from it.</p><h3><strong>Pennsylvania&#8217;s Permitting Problem Was Really Three Problems</strong></h3><p>It&#8217;s worth being precise about what was broken, because each of Shapiro&#8217;s reforms targeted a different failure.</p><ol><li><p>The first was <strong>volume</strong>. Applications piled up faster than DEP could review them, and nothing forced the department to prioritize.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p>The second was <strong>uncertainty</strong>. Agencies had no public timelines. An applicant waiting four months had no way to know whether that was normal, slow, or stuck.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p>The third was <strong>coordination</strong>. A major project needing permits from DEP, PennDOT, and local authorities had no single point of contact and no one responsible for moving the whole package.</p></li></ol><p>A reform aimed at one of these problems won&#8217;t necessarily solve the others. That distinction turns out to matter a great deal.</p><h3><strong>What Did Pennsylvania Actually Build?</strong></h3><p>The reforms came in four layers.</p><ol><li><p><strong>PAyback (2023):</strong> Executive Order 2023-07 directed every agency to document each permit type, its legal basis, its fee, and a target processing time, and to publish them. If an agency misses its own target without an extension, the applicant gets the fee back.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><strong>SPEED (2024&#8211;25):</strong> The Streamlining Permits for Economic Expansion and Development (SPEED) program lets applicants pay a DEP-approved outside professional (an engineer, surveyor, or environmental scientist meeting licensing and conflict-of-interest standards) to conduct the first technical review of eligible permits. DEP still issues the final decision. The applicant pays both the state fee and the reviewer.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><strong>PA Permit Fast Track (2024):</strong> Executive Order 2024-04 created a program, run by the new Office of Transformation and Opportunity, to coordinate review of major economic-development and infrastructure projects. Developers can ask to join, but the administration decides which projects get in. Participants get a coordinated permitting timetable, a public dashboard, and a single point of contact across agencies.</p></li></ol><ol start="4"><li><p><strong>Deemed approval (2025):</strong> The 2025&#8211;26 budget, Act 45, expanded SPEED to more permit categories. It also set statutory clocks: 30 days for certain air-quality permits and 60 days for stormwater and groundwater permits. After that, a permit is automatically approved if DEP hasn&#8217;t acted or sought an extension.</p></li></ol><p>This is not deregulation in the usual sense. The environmental standards largely stayed the same. <em><strong>What changed was the clock, the visibility, and who does the first read.</strong></em></p><h3><strong>So, Is It Working?</strong></h3><p>Measured against the three problems above (volume, uncertainty, coordination), the record is strongest where the reforms were least glamorous. One asterisk also applies throughout: nearly every number comes from the administration itself, and none has been independently audited.</p><ol><li><p><strong>Volume: largely solved, by the state&#8217;s account.</strong> DEP says the backlog is gone, and the administration says average processing time fell from 53 days to 38. It reports similar gains elsewhere: business filings that averaged 14 days now take one, and new-teacher certification waits fell by about 10 weeks.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><strong>Uncertainty: better, but unproven.</strong> Published targets and statutory clocks now tell applicants what to expect. But since 2023 the state has issued just five PAyback refunds out of more than 40 million applications. Either agencies almost never miss their deadlines, or the deadlines were set loosely enough that almost nothing counts as late. Until the state shows how its targets compare with past processing times, there&#8217;s no way to know which.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><strong>Coordination: the weakest link.</strong> Fast Track, the most heavily branded reform, was built for this problem. But a September 2026 analysis by the conservative outlet Broad + Liberty, republished by PoliticsPA, found nothing in the executive order that lets a Fast Track project finish ahead of a comparable project outside it. The administration cites wins, like a Lackawanna County project it says saved 18 months, but what the program guarantees is coordination, not acceleration.</p></li></ol><h3><strong>Key Policy Takeaway &#8212; The Boring Parts Did the Work</strong></h3><p>If Pennsylvania&#8217;s reforms delivered, the credit belongs to the least glamorous pieces: <em><strong>published deadlines, backlog triage, and statutory clocks.</strong></em></p><p>A target posted publicly creates internal pressure. A deemed-approval deadline creates legal pressure. Clearing a backlog frees staff to work on new applications instead of old ones.</p><p>The flagship program and the effective machinery aren&#8217;t the same thing. States copying Pennsylvania should prioritize copying the machinery.</p><h3><strong>The Strongest Critique Is About Who Gets the Fast Lane</strong></h3><p>The most serious objection to Pennsylvania&#8217;s reforms isn&#8217;t that they made government faster. It&#8217;s that speed became something the state handed out, and not always by rules the public could see.</p><p><em><strong>Some applicants can buy it.</strong></em> SPEED gives applicants who can afford an outside reviewer a faster first review. Environmental groups, including PennFuture, warn that DEP staff will feel pressure to defer to a paid recommendation rather than re-examine it. DEP calls the program &#8220;staff augmentation,&#8221; extra capacity rather than weaker review. Whether that holds depends on how often DEP reviewers actually push back, and no public data shows how often they do.</p><p><em><strong>One applicant got it privately.</strong></em> Internal emails reported by Heatmap News show that in April 2025, Shapiro&#8217;s office offered Amazon &#8220;exclusive early access&#8221; to SPEED. The offer came two months before SPEED opened to the public, and before Amazon announced a $20 billion data-center investment that Shapiro called the largest private investment in state history. The memo was marked as subject to a nondisclosure agreement. Whether that access sped up a single permit matters less than the signal: reforms sold on transparency gave their most powerful applicant a side door.</p><p><em><strong>The public absorbs the risk when the clock runs out.</strong></em> Deemed approval works when DEP is staffed to meet its deadlines. If it isn&#8217;t, because of a budget squeeze, a hiring freeze, or a flood of applications, the default outcome is approval without full review. That trade-off may be defensible. It should be made openly.</p><p><em><strong>And communities got a say last.</strong></em> Data centers are where these critiques converge. By July 2026, 74% of Pennsylvania voters opposed an AI data center in their own community, including 82% of Democrats, according to Quinnipiac. In August, Shapiro pulled every data-center project out of Fast Track, banned nondisclosure agreements with developers, and barred DEP from issuing permits without local approval. Because Fast Track never guaranteed faster permits, the move was largely symbolic. But the symbolism was the point: the fight was never about permitting efficiency. It was about who gets a say before the process starts.</p><h3><strong>The Blueprint for Other States</strong></h3><p>Pennsylvania&#8217;s experience offers four lessons.</p><ol><li><p><em><strong>Start with deadlines and publication.</strong></em> Public target times, backlog triage, and statutory clocks are the unglamorous core of permitting reform. They&#8217;re also the part most likely to be doing the work.</p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><em><strong>Make the guarantee verifiable.</strong></em> A money-back guarantee that pays out five times in three years proves nothing on its own. Publish the historical baseline behind each target, and let an auditor, a university, or the legislature&#8217;s fiscal office check the results.</p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><em><strong>Build the fast lane in the open.</strong></em> If a state offers expedited coordination, admission criteria should be public, access should be open, and there should be no side doors or nondisclosure agreements. The Amazon emails did more damage to the reforms&#8217; credibility than any processing statistic could repair.</p></li></ol><ol start="4"><li><p><em><strong>Separate speed from consent.</strong></em> Permitting reform answers &#8220;how fast?&#8221; It doesn&#8217;t answer &#8220;should this be built here?&#8221; States that don&#8217;t settle the second question upstream, through siting standards, community-benefit rules, and local input, will find it resurfacing as a revolt against the first.</p></li></ol><h3><strong>Bottom Line</strong></h3><p>Pennsylvania has built something Democrats should want to copy.</p><p>A faster, more transparent permitting system isn&#8217;t a concession to business. It&#8217;s a precondition for building the housing, transmission, and clean energy that a progressive agenda depends on.</p><p>But speed is a means, not a mandate. The data-center fight revealed what the efficiency agenda had skipped: whether communities had been asked, and whether every applicant was playing by the same rules.</p><p>Pennsylvania learned that a state can process a permit in 38 days and still not have permission. <em><strong>Other states should copy its deadlines, and build their fast lanes in public.</strong></em></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Red State Lessons - Takeaways From The “Mississippi Miracle”]]></title><description><![CDATA[Mississippi became a national education model by pairing high expectations with unusually serious state capacity. The lesson is bigger than phonics and more complicated than holding third graders back]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/red-state-lessons-takeaways-from</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/red-state-lessons-takeaways-from</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 15:40:14 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RFAI!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5fb28aea-6d53-4bf7-bd50-4754a418c60f_1280x1280.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong><span>Big Picture</span></strong></h2><p><span>Mississippi&#8217;s reading gains complicate the usual partisan story about public education.</span></p><p><span>A Republican-led state took responsibility for a stubborn statewide problem, treated implementation as the state&#8217;s job, and stayed with the effort long enough to produce measurable improvement. That is why Mississippi can serve as a Red State Lesson when it comes to education reform.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Democrats do not need to embrace every part of the Mississippi model to confront the challenge it presents: ambitious policy is only as progressive as the public institutions capable of delivering it.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>The task is to borrow that governing seriousness without importing punitive features or claiming more than the evidence supports.</span></p><h2><strong><span>The Mississippi Context</span></strong></h2><p><span>Before reform, Mississippi routinely appeared near the bottom of national education rankings. Low performance reflected poverty, unequal opportunity, weak early-learning access, inconsistent instructional practice, and a state system that had not built the capacity to improve teaching at scale.</span></p><p><span>The policy response developed over years. Mississippi raised academic standards, strengthened its school accountability system, invested in early childhood education, and built a more active state education department. </span><em><strong><span>The 2013 Literacy-Based Promotion Act sat inside that larger structure.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>That context matters because &#8220;science of reading&#8221; laws can sound deceptively simple. Legislatures can require evidence-based instruction &#8211; they cannot create thousands of teachers who understand how to deliver it by changing statutory language alone.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Importantly, Mississippi invested in implementation.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>The state trained educators, deployed literacy coaches&#8212;initially concentrating them in low-performing schools&#8212;approved screening tools, produced instructional guidance, and required schools to communicate with parents. The third-grade promotion rule created urgency, but the state also built supports intended to prevent children from reaching the gate unprepared.</span></p><p><span>The politically visible reform, a &#8220;3rd Grade Gate,&#8221; was </span><em><strong><span>a mandate</span></strong></em><span>, the administratively important reform was </span><em><strong><span>a delivery system.</span></strong></em></p><h2><strong><span>How the Mississippi Model Works</span></strong></h2><p><span>The Literacy-Based Promotion Act requires schools to screen students in kindergarten through third grade for reading deficiencies and notify parents when a child is substantially behind. </span><em><strong><span>Students receive an individual reading plan and targeted intervention.</span></strong></em></p><p><em><strong><span>Teachers and school leaders receive training</span></strong></em><span> aligned with evidence about how children learn to read, including explicit instruction in foundational skills. State literacy coaches work with schools on classroom practice, data, and instructional planning.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>The most controversial provision, the &#8220;3rd Grade Gate,&#8221; </span></strong></em><span>arrives at the end of 3rd grade when students generally must demonstrate a minimum level of reading proficiency through the state assessment or an approved alternative to advance. The law provides limited &#8220;good cause&#8221; exemptions, including for some English learners, students with significant disabilities, and students who demonstrate proficiency through an alternative route.</span></p><p><span>Students who are retained are supposed to receive intensive intervention rather than repeat the identical year. The theory is that fourth grade marks a shift from learning to read toward using reading to learn across subjects. Proponents argue that promoting a child without foundational skills can turn one year of difficulty into years of accumulated academic failure.</span></p><p><span>The counterargument is equally serious: retention imposes social and emotional costs, affects older and disadvantaged students disproportionately, and can become a substitute for adequate support.</span></p><p><span>Mississippi&#8217;s model rests on the claim that </span><em><strong><span>retention is a last-resort accountability measure within a much broader literacy system&#8212;not the system itself.</span></strong></em></p><h2><strong><span>What Mississippi Got Right</span></strong></h2><p><span>Mississippi made the state responsible for more than issuing rules.</span></p><p><span>It created </span><em><strong><span>common expectations, screened children repeatedly, gave parents clearer information, trained teachers, sent coaches into classrooms, and built a state department capable of monitoring implementation.</span></strong></em><span> It then sustained the work across political cycles.</span></p><p><span>This is a useful lesson for progressive education policy reformers because progressive policymaking sometimes places great faith in the ambition of a statute while paying less attention to the public machinery needed to carry it out. Mississippi&#8217;s approach recognized that </span><em><strong><span>implementation is itself a policy choice.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>The sequence also matters. A state should not impose a high-stakes consequence on a child before it can show that the school provided high-quality curriculum, trained instruction, early identification, and meaningful intervention.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Accountability without capacity punishes. Capacity without accountability can dissipate.</span></strong></em><span> Mississippi tried to build both and states looking to build off their successes should do the same.</span></p><h2><strong><span>What the Evidence Says and Does Not Say</span></strong></h2><p><span>On the measure most closely associated with the education reform, Mississippi produced tangible results.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Its fourth-grade reading scores improved substantially over the decade following enactment while national performance stagnated or declined.</span></strong></em><span> The gains reached beyond a single district and appeared among historically underserved students as well as the statewide average.</span></p><p><span>But attribution requires discipline.</span></p><p><span>The literacy law coincided with stronger standards, accountability changes, early-childhood investments, and a sustained administrative campaign. The third-grade retention rule can also change the composition of the tested fourth-grade population: some struggling students remain in third grade and take the fourth-grade assessment later.</span></p><p><span>Researchers disagree about how much that mechanical effect explains. Emerging work suggests retention accounts for some, but not most, of Mississippi&#8217;s relative gains. The results also weaken as students age. Mississippi&#8217;s eighth-grade reading performance has not produced the same celebrated national standing as fourth grade. That could mean early gains fade, older-grade instruction does not build on them, or the fourth-grade measure overstates the durable effect.</span></p><p><span>This is not evidence that nothing improved &#8211; </span><em><strong><span>it is evidence that early literacy is a foundation, not a complete K&#8211;12 strategy.</span></strong></em></p><h2><strong><span>What to Borrow from the Mississippi Model</span></strong></h2><p><span>Policy designs and principles to borrow from Mississippi model:</span></p><ol><li><p><strong><span>A state role in implementation.</span></strong><span> District autonomy should not mean handing schools a vendor list and walking away. States can build expertise, vet materials, train teachers, and target coaching where local capacity is thinnest.</span></p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><strong><span>Intervention before crisis.</span></strong><span> The promotion decision should never be the first moment a family learns that a child is struggling. Regular screening should trigger timely, specific support.</span></p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><strong><span>Policy alignment.</span></strong><span> Curriculum, teacher preparation, coaching, assessment, family communication, and accountability should reinforce the same instructional strategy.</span></p></li></ol><ol start="4"><li><p><strong><span>Staying power.</span></strong><span> Mississippi treated early literacy as sustained governing work, not a one-session legislative achievement. The gains developed over years and across political cycles.</span></p></li></ol><ol start="5"><li><p><strong><span>A willingness to measure results.</span></strong><span> The state set a legible goal and made performance visible. Democrats should pair that focus with a broader dashboard extending through middle school and graduation.</span></p></li></ol><p><span>The broader lesson is that Mississippi&#8217;s model works as a system, not as a menu. </span><em><strong><span>States cannot separate the visible mandate from the less visible public capacity that gives it a chance to succeed.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>A third-grade gate without early intervention, trained teachers, and sustained support shifts responsibility for institutional failures onto children.</span></p><p><span>Democratic education reformers across the country should borrow Mississippi&#8217;s seriousness about implementation while rejecting the idea that consequences can substitute for capacity. The question for other states is not whether to copy Mississippi, but whether they are prepared to build&#8212;and improve upon&#8212;the conditions that made its gains possible.</span></p><h2><strong><span>The Adaptation Test</span></strong></h2><p><span>Before borrowing from Mississippi, policymakers should be able to answer five questions:</span></p><ol><li><p><strong><span>Capacity:</span></strong><span> Has the state funded teacher training, coaching, strong materials, screening, and intervention&#8212;or merely required them?</span></p></li><li><p><strong><span>Timing:</span></strong><span> Will children receive help well before a third-grade promotion decision?</span></p></li><li><p><strong><span>Fairness:</span></strong><span> Are exemptions, appeals, accommodations, and family communication clear and accessible?</span></p></li><li><p><strong><span>Continuity:</span></strong><span> Does the literacy strategy continue into later grades, when students must use reading to learn increasingly complex material?</span></p></li><li><p><strong><span>Evidence:</span></strong><span> Will the state track not only fourth-grade scores, but also repeated retention, attendance, special-education identification, discipline, middle-school achievement, and graduation?</span></p></li></ol><p><span>If the answer to those questions is no, </span><em><strong><span>a state is not adapting Mississippi&#8217;s system &#8211; it is borrowing its slogan.</span></strong></em></p><h2><strong><span>Red State Takeaway</span></strong></h2><p><span>Mississippi did not discover a miracle.</span><em><strong><span> It built a system.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>The state set a clear goal, aligned policy around it, invested in educators, monitored children early, involved parents, and maintained pressure to improve. The &#8220;3rd Grade Gate&#8221; was part of that system, but it was not a magic ingredient.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Democratic policymakers should be willing to learn from a Republican-led state that produced meaningful gains. They should also improve on the model:</span></strong></em><span> fund the supports fully, protect children from crude high-stakes consequences, measure outcomes beyond a single test, and connect literacy reform to the conditions that shape learning outside the classroom.</span></p><p><span>The lesson from Mississippi is </span><em><strong><span>not that government should become more punitive. It is that government must become more capable.</span></strong></em></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Washington’s Carbon Market Passed Its Political Test. The Policy Test Comes Next.]]></title><description><![CDATA[Voters preserved the Climate Commitment Act, but long-term success will depend on lower emissions, disciplined spending, and affordable alternatives for working families.]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/washingtons-carbon-market-passed</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/washingtons-carbon-market-passed</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 14:18:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RFAI!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5fb28aea-6d53-4bf7-bd50-4754a418c60f_1280x1280.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Big Picture</h2><p>Washington did not merely pass an ambitious climate law. It put that law before voters after fuel prices rose&#8212;and won.</p><p><em><strong>The 2021 Climate Commitment Act (CCA) created a statewide cap-and-invest system.</strong></em> Large emitters must hold an allowance for each metric ton of covered greenhouse-gas emissions. The total supply of allowances declines over time, while auction revenue finances transportation, clean energy, environmental justice, tribal projects, wildfire resilience, building efficiency, and assistance for households.</p><p>The first auctions began in 2023 and generated far more revenue than early budget writers expected. They also intensified <em><strong>a basic political problem: when a carbon price flows through fuel and other markets, voters can see the cost immediately while the climate benefit arrives gradually and the public investment is spread across hundreds of projects.</strong></em></p><p>Opponents responded with Initiative 2117, a 2024 ballot measure that would have repealed the cap-and-invest program and barred agencies from establishing a similar system. <em><strong>Washington voters rejected it by a decisive margin.</strong></em></p><p>That vote made the state&#8217;s experiment nationally important. </p><p>While Washington demonstrated that cap-and-invest can survive direct democratic review, it has not yet demonstrated that the program will deliver emissions reductions efficiently, protect households from regressive costs, and spend billions with enough discipline to retain public trust.</p><h2>From Climate Target to Carbon Market</h2><p>Before the Climate Commitment Act, Washington had statutory emissions goals and a growing set of sector-specific policies. <em><strong>What it lacked was an economy-wide mechanism that forced covered emissions downward while producing durable revenue for transition</strong></em>.</p><p>Washington enacted the CCA in 2021, when Democrats controlled the governor&#8217;s office and both chambers of the state Legislature. The program covers large facilities, fuel suppliers, natural-gas utilities, and other entities meeting statutory thresholds. Electricity imported into the state is also addressed, with rules intended to limit leakage.</p><p><em><strong>The law&#8217;s politics depended on reinvestment.</strong></em> Cap-and-invest was not sold simply as a price signal. Auction revenue would fund the infrastructure and household transition needed to make lower emissions possible.</p><p>It also embedded environmental-justice requirements. At least 35% of specified investments must provide direct and meaningful benefits to vulnerable populations within overburdened communities, with a target of 40%. Additional provisions direct resources and consultation toward tribes.</p><h2>What Does the Climate Commitment Act Do?</h2><p>Under the CCA, the Department of Ecology sets an emissions cap and issues a limited number of allowances. </p><p>Each allowance authorizes its holder to emit <em><strong>one metric ton of greenhouse gases </strong></em>covered by the program. Covered businesses obtain allowances through quarterly auctions, secondary markets, or limited free allocation. </p><p>The auctions operate differently from a traditional highest-bidder-wins sale. Participants submit sealed bids specifying how many allowances they want and what they are willing to pay. Ecology ranks those bids from highest to lowest and distributes allowances until the available supply is exhausted. The lowest successful bid becomes the settlement price paid by every winning bidder.</p><p>Companies that do not obtain enough allowances at auction can purchase them from other market participants&#8212;or reduce their emissions and lower the number they need. <em><strong>This structure turns the state&#8217;s emissions limit into a market price. </strong></em></p><p>As Washington reduces the number of available allowances <em><strong>over time, continued pollution should become more expensive, giving businesses a financial incentive to invest in cleaner operations.</strong></em> Meanwhile, <em><strong>auction proceeds flow into state accounts where the Legislature appropriates them</strong></em> for transportation electrification, public transit, building efficiency, clean-energy development, air-quality improvement, natural and working lands, climate resilience, and other authorized uses under the CCA.</p><h2>Key Policy Takeaway &#8212; Carbon Pricing Needs a Public-Benefit Strategy</h2><p>Economists often describe carbon pricing as elegant: make pollution more expensive and allow the market to find the cheapest reductions. But politics is less elegant.</p><p>Consumers do not experience an allowance auction. They experience gasoline, heating, food, and freight prices. <em><strong>If the state cannot show where the money goes and who benefits, cap-and-invest can look like a complicated tax whose environmental result is impossible to see.</strong></em></p><p>Washington&#8217;s most replicable choice was to treat investment as integral to the policy. </p><p>By fiscal year 2025, the state reported that 61% of initial spending benefited vulnerable populations in overburdened communities&#8212;above the 35% statutory minimum. <em><strong>Projects included energy-bill assistance, public and active transportation, clean energy, habitat, and wildfire resilience.</strong></em></p><p>That does not by itself prove the investments are effective. However, it does make the distributional promise measurable.</p><h2>So, Is It Working?</h2><p>Financially and politically, the program has cleared two major tests while another significant test remains.</p><p>Auctions have generated more than $4.5 billion since the program began. <em><strong>The revenue has moved cap-and-invest from an abstract climate instrument into a major part of the state budget.</strong></em></p><p>Then voters considered repeal. <em><strong>Initiative 2117 lost with roughly 62% voting no.</strong></em> The result did not prove that every voter supports carbon pricing. The campaign also focused on the transportation, clean-air, and community investments that repeal would eliminate. But the outcome showed that opponents could not convert anger over fuel costs into a statewide majority for dismantling the law.</p><p><em><strong>The environmental test will take longer. </strong></em>Covered entities operate within multiyear compliance periods, allowance banking affects when reductions occur, and statewide emissions data arrive with a lag. <em><strong>Revenue is not the same as reduced pollution.</strong></em> <em><strong>Nor does selling every allowance demonstrate that each funded project is cost-effective.</strong></em></p><p>Accordingly, one would be wise to resist declaring victory from Washington&#8217;s auction totals alone. <em><strong>The central outcome is the emissions trajectory, followed by local air quality and the household cost of achieving it.</strong></em></p><h2>The Strongest Critique Is About Cost and Accountability</h2><p>The case against the CCA begins with fuel prices.</p><p>Suppliers can pass allowance costs to consumers. The precise effect is contested, but pretending there is no effect undermines trust. Carbon pricing is designed to make high-emission activity more expensive. <em><strong>The relevant questions are how much costs rise, who bears them, and whether investments create affordable alternatives.</strong></em></p><p>Critics also argue that <em><strong>unexpectedly high revenue can weaken spending discipline. </strong></em>When billions are distributed across agencies and legislative accounts, projects may be branded as climate investments without demonstrating material emissions reductions or resilience benefits.</p><p><em><strong>Free allowances create another tension. </strong></em>They can protect jobs and prevent emissions leakage, but they also reduce the immediate incentive for covered industries. Market linkage may reduce costs while making Washington&#8217;s system harder for voters to understand.</p><p>Finally, a cap can be weakened through excessive offsets, reserve allowances, exemptions, or accounting choices. <em><strong>The law&#8217;s credibility depends on the integrity of the declining limit, not the sophistication of the auction platform.</strong></em></p><h2>The Blueprint for Other States</h2><p>Washington and the CCA offer six lessons.</p><p>1. Legislate the emissions cap, not only the revenue mechanism. The environmental obligation must remain clear when auction receipts fluctuate.</p><p>2. Make household and community benefits visible. Bill assistance, transit, building upgrades, and local air-quality investments should be traceable by place and population.</p><p>3. Report costs honestly. States should publish independent estimates of consumer incidence rather than dismissing every price effect or accepting the largest industry claim.</p><p>4. Build spending discipline before revenue arrives. Every appropriation should identify an emissions, resilience, affordability, or environmental-justice outcome.</p><p>5. Protect trade-exposed industries conditionally. Free allowances should decline or change when leakage risk falls and should not become a permanent entitlement.</p><p>6. Prepare for repeal politics. Washington survived because supporters defended both the climate goal and the tangible investments financed by the program.</p><h2>Bottom Line</h2><p>Washington has built one of the most consequential state climate policies in the country.</p><p>The Climate Commitment Act has <em><strong>created a binding carbon market, raised billions, directed substantial resources toward overburdened communities, and survived an explicit statewide repeal vote. </strong></em>Those are real accomplishments.</p><p>But the program&#8217;s durability now creates a higher standard. </p><p>Washington must show <em><strong>that emissions are falling because of a credible cap, that investments are more than a list of worthy projects, and that</strong></em> <em><strong>working families receive affordable alternatives to the behavior the state is making more expensive</strong></em>.</p><p>The lesson for other states is not simply &#8220;put a price on carbon.&#8221; It is to build the political and administrative system around that price&#8212;and <em><strong>keep proving what the public receives in return.</strong></em></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Oregon Made Housing Production a State Responsibility. Can It Make Cities Build?]]></title><description><![CDATA[SB 1537 gives Oregon new tools to finance, accelerate, and enforce housing production&#8212;but it cannot repeal interest rates or build homes on its own.]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/oregon-made-housing-production-a</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/oregon-made-housing-production-a</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 16:45:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RFAI!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5fb28aea-6d53-4bf7-bd50-4754a418c60f_1280x1280.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Big Picture</h2><p>For decades, Oregon has been one of America&#8217;s leading laboratories for state land-use policy. Now it is testing a more difficult proposition: if the state is willing to tell cities where housing should be allowed, should it also help them build the infrastructure&#8212;and enforce the rules when they do not comply?</p><p>That is the bet behind Senate Bill 1537, Governor Tina Kotek&#8217;s 2024 housing production package.</p><p>The law does not rely on one grand solution. It creates a Housing Accountability and Production Office, gives qualifying projects temporary flexibility from some local development standards, makes certain housing decisions faster, opens a limited route for cities to expand urban growth boundaries, and commits state resources to infrastructure and affordable housing.</p><p>In other words, Oregon is trying to address the entire gap between zoning a home and completing one.</p><p>The early evidence is necessarily incomplete. Several major provisions took effect only in 2025. Oregon is still producing far fewer homes than Kotek&#8217;s target, and expensive credit and construction costs are suppressing projects that have little to do with local permitting. But the design of SB 1537 already offers a useful blueprint: housing mandates work better when the state pairs enforcement with technical assistance and money.</p><p>It also offers a warning. Government can make a home legal and easier to permit. It cannot make an uneconomic project finance itself.</p><h2>Oregon&#8217;s Housing System Stopped Producing Enough Homes</h2><p>Oregon entered the decade with an unusually strong statewide planning system and an increasingly severe housing shortage.</p><p>The state had already legalized duplexes and other &#8220;middle housing&#8221; in many communities and required larger cities to plan for housing needs. But legal capacity did not reliably become completed housing. Projects could still encounter local design standards, infrastructure constraints, uncertain interpretation of state law, and lengthy permitting. Meanwhile, high interest rates and rising material, labor, and insurance costs weakened the financial case for construction.</p><p>Kotek took office in 2023 and set a target of 36,000 new homes per year. The target was intentionally ambitious: Oregon needed to increase production substantially, not merely return to a weak baseline.</p><p>SB 1537 followed a failed 2023 attempt to pass some of the same ideas. The earlier proposal drew opposition from local governments and environmental and land-use advocates, particularly over required adjustments to local rules. The 2024 package narrowed and revised those provisions, added infrastructure support, and preserved limits around Oregon&#8217;s urban growth system.</p><p>That legislative history matters. Oregon did not abandon statewide land-use planning to pursue supply. It tried to make that system deliver more housing.</p><h2>What Does SB 1537 Do?</h2><p>The law&#8217;s most important institutional change is the Housing Accountability and Production Office, or HAPO.</p><p>The office is jointly operated by the Department of Land Conservation and Development and the state Building Codes Division. It helps local governments and developers interpret housing, land-use, building-code, and permitting requirements. It can coordinate state agencies, investigate complaints, provide technical assistance, and take enforcement action when local governments violate state housing law. Its enforcement authority became operative July 1, 2025.</p><p>That combination is deliberate. A state office that only punishes cities can produce defensiveness and litigation. An office that only advises can be ignored. HAPO is designed to do both.</p><p>SB 1537 also requires local governments to grant qualifying housing projects adjustments from certain development and design standards. Those may include rules governing setbacks, lot coverage, building orientation, and some dimensional requirements. The policy does not erase building codes or every local standard. It creates a limited escape valve when specified rules make otherwise lawful housing difficult to build.</p><p>The law makes other procedural changes: applicants with pending projects may opt into updated local rules; certain housing applications receive a more streamlined form of land-use review; and prevailing parties in some housing appeals have broader access to attorney fees.</p><p>On land supply, qualifying cities receive a one-time, time-limited process to add or exchange a constrained amount of land at the urban edge, subject to affordability, planning, and review requirements. On infrastructure, the law creates support for water, sewer, transportation, and other investments needed to turn planned land into buildable sites. It also directs funding toward affordable and moderate-income housing.</p><p>This is not blanket deregulation. It is a state attempt to identify&#8212;and intervene at&#8212;several separate choke points.</p><h2>Key Policy Takeaway &#8212; Enforcement and Capacity Belong Together</h2><p>The strongest feature of Oregon&#8217;s approach is not any single zoning rule. It is the decision to combine accountability with implementation support.</p><p>States often issue housing targets or preempt a narrow local restriction, then leave cities and builders to navigate everything else. SB 1537 recognizes that housing can fail at multiple handoffs: a city may misunderstand state law, a building department may lack staff, an approved site may lack sewer capacity, or a legal project may be blocked by an inflexible design standard.</p><p>HAPO gives participants one place to surface those problems. Infrastructure funding gives cities a reason&#8212;and a practical ability&#8212;to resolve them. Enforcement creates consequences when the barrier is not capacity but resistance.</p><p>Other states should pay attention to that institutional architecture. The housing shortage is partly a rules problem, but it is also a delivery problem.</p><h2>So, Is It Working?</h2><p>It is too soon to answer confidently.</p><p>The mandatory-adjustment and streamlined-review provisions began operating in January 2025. HAPO&#8217;s enforcement powers followed in July. The office&#8217;s initial statutory reports are due to the Legislature in September 2026. A fair evaluation therefore has to distinguish implementation evidence from housing-market outcomes.</p><p>The immediate implementation evidence is clear: Oregon has created the office, issued detailed guidance, opened an inquiry and complaint process, and required local governments to apply the new adjustment rules. The machinery exists.</p><p>The production evidence is more sobering. Oregon remains far below its 36,000-home annual goal. Multifamily permitting fell sharply during the broader financing slowdown. Portland&#8217;s experience captures the mixed picture: middle-housing reforms have produced thousands of duplex, fourplex, accessory-dwelling, and cottage-cluster units since 2021, while overall housing production has recently weakened.</p><p>That does not establish that SB 1537 failed. Most of those outcomes reflect projects conceived or financed before its major provisions took effect. It does establish that procedural reform is operating against powerful economic headwinds.</p><p>The correct near-term test is not whether Oregon suddenly reaches 36,000 homes. It is whether comparable projects move through review faster, whether HAPO resolves recurring barriers, whether infrastructure awards unlock stalled sites, and whether the temporary adjustment process produces homes that would otherwise not pencil out.</p><h2>The Strongest Critique Is That Oregon May Be Solving Yesterday&#8217;s Constraint</h2><p>When financing was cheap and demand was strong, zoning and permitting delays were often the binding constraint. In a high-cost capital market, a project may be fully legal and promptly approved but still impossible to finance.</p><p>That is the strongest critique of SB 1537: Oregon may have built an elaborate system for speeding approvals at the moment when interest rates, construction costs, and weak project economics became more important.</p><p>Local governments raise a second objection. State mandates can force cities to process growth without enough staff or infrastructure revenue. Even with state funding, temporary grants may not cover the long-term operating and maintenance costs that new development creates.</p><p>Land-use advocates offer a third warning. Expedited urban growth boundary changes could weaken Oregon&#8217;s long-standing effort to limit sprawl, protect farmland, and direct development toward existing communities. The law includes limits, but implementation will determine whether those limits hold.</p><p>These critiques are not arguments for returning to discretionary delay. They are reasons to evaluate each part honestly. Faster permitting should be measured in time saved. Infrastructure funding should be measured in homes unlocked. Boundary expansions should be measured against affordability and environmental promises. </p><p>None should receive credit merely because the statute exists.</p><h2>The Blueprint for Other States</h2><p>Oregon&#8217;s model offers five lessons.</p><p>1. Create a housing referee with both assistance and enforcement power. State housing law is ineffective when no institution is responsible for resolving disputes quickly.</p><p>2. Treat permitting as an operating system. Deadlines, objective standards, appeals, staffing, and interagency coordination matter as much as the zoning map.</p><p>3. Pair local obligations with infrastructure support. States should not demand housing production while ignoring pipes, roads, schools, and utility capacity.</p><p>4. Make flexibility bounded and reviewable. Targeted adjustments can remove rules that unintentionally block housing without suspending health, safety, environmental, or fair-housing protections.</p><p>5. Separate policy performance from market conditions. A state should report approval times and resolved barriers even when interest rates suppress construction&#8212;and should not claim credit for units already in the pipeline.</p><h2>Bottom Line</h2><p>Oregon&#8217;s housing experiment is more sophisticated than the usual argument between local control and state preemption.</p><p>SB 1537 says the state can set expectations, help cities meet them, finance the infrastructure that growth requires, and enforce the law when cooperation fails. That is a credible governing model.</p><p>But it is not a housing-production machine. Oregon still has to prove that its new office can resolve real barriers, that infrastructure money reaches projects that will actually be built, and that regulatory flexibility produces homes without sacrificing the values embedded in the state&#8217;s land-use system.</p><p>Other states should copy Oregon&#8217;s willingness to own implementation. They should not copy its policies on faith.</p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Colorado is Leading as America's AI Laboratory]]></title><description><![CDATA[The country's first comprehensive AI law isn't just regulating technology. It's testing how Democrats may govern artificial intelligence for the next decade.]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/colorado-is-leading-as-americas-ai</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/colorado-is-leading-as-americas-ai</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 14:47:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RFAI!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5fb28aea-6d53-4bf7-bd50-4754a418c60f_1280x1280.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong><span>Big Picture</span></strong></h3><p><span>The race to regulate artificial intelligence has officially left Washington.</span></p><p><span>While Congress continues debating how&#8212;or even whether&#8212;to establish a national framework for AI, Colorado has moved first. By passing the </span><a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/bill_files/47770/download"><span>Colorado AI Act</span></a><span>, state lawmakers have positioned Colorado as the nation&#8217;s first large-scale testing ground for comprehensive AI governance.</span></p><p><span>The law represents something larger than a single piece of technology legislation. It is an early glimpse into how Democratic policymakers may attempt to balance innovation, consumer protection, and economic competitiveness in the age of artificial intelligence.</span></p><p><span>If the law proves workable, don&#8217;t expect it to remain a Colorado experiment for long.</span></p><h3><strong><span>What&#8217;s happening</span></strong></h3><p><span>The Colorado AI Act establishes one of the country&#8217;s first broad regulatory frameworks governing &#8220;high-risk&#8221; artificial intelligence systems.</span></p><p><span>Rather than regulating every AI application equally, the law focuses on systems used to make consequential decisions affecting people&#8217;s lives, including:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>employment</span></p></li><li><p><span>housing</span></p></li><li><p><span>lending</span></p></li><li><p><span>education</span></p></li><li><p><span>healthcare</span></p></li><li><p><span>insurance</span></p></li></ul><p><span>Developers and deployers of those systems assume new responsibilities surrounding:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>risk management</span></p></li><li><p><span>impact assessments</span></p></li><li><p><span>transparency</span></p></li><li><p><span>consumer notification</span></p></li><li><p><span>discrimination mitigation</span></p></li></ul><p><span>In short, Colorado is attempting to answer a question Washington has yet to resolve: how should the government oversee AI before significant harms occur?</span></p><h3><strong><span>Why it matters</span></strong></h3><p><span>Artificial intelligence increasingly touches nearly every aspect of modern life.</span></p><p><span>Companies now rely on AI to screen job applicants, approve loans, evaluate insurance claims, recommend medical treatment, and determine which advertisements consumers see. Those systems can create enormous efficiencies but they can also replicate bias, produce opaque decision-making, and generate outcomes that neither consumers nor regulators fully understand.</span></p><p><span>Colorado&#8217;s law reflects an emerging Democratic philosophy: innovation should continue&#8212;but not without guardrails.</span></p><h3><strong><span>Between the lines</span></strong></h3><p><span>The legislation also illustrates a broader governing trend.</span></p><p><span>For decades, states frequently waited for Congress to establish national regulatory standards. Increasingly, the opposite is occurring. States are becoming the first movers. California has long shaped national privacy debates. Colorado is now attempting to play a similar role in artificial intelligence.</span></p><p><span>If enough states adopt comparable frameworks, Congress may eventually face pressure to harmonize the rules nationally.</span></p><h3><strong><span>Can it scale?</span></strong></h3><p><span>Several Democratic-led states&#8212;including California, New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois&#8212;have all explored AI governance through legislation or executive action.</span></p><p><span>Each is likely watching Colorado closely.</span></p><p><span>The biggest implementation questions include:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Can regulators enforce complex technical requirements?</span></p></li><li><p><span>Will compliance costs discourage innovation?</span></p></li><li><p><span>Can businesses operate efficiently under differing state standards?</span></p></li><li><p><span>Will consumers actually receive greater protection?</span></p></li></ul><p><span>Colorado is effectively becoming the country&#8217;s pilot program.</span></p><h3><strong><span>Bottom line</span></strong></h3><p><span>Every generation faces a technological revolution that outpaces existing law.</span></p><p><span>For previous generations, it was railroads, automobiles, telecommunications, or the internet. Today, it is artificial intelligence.</span></p><p><span>Colorado has become one of the first states willing to move from debating AI governance to actually building it.</span></p><p><span>Whether the Colorado AI Act ultimately succeeds or requires significant revision, one thing is already clear: the future of AI regulation is being shaped in state capitols before it reaches Capitol Hill.</span></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can Michigan Rebuild the Union State?]]></title><description><![CDATA[Democrats repealed right-to-work. Now comes the harder part.]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/can-michigan-rebuild-the-union-state</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/can-michigan-rebuild-the-union-state</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 16:38:43 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!RFAI!,w_256,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F5fb28aea-6d53-4bf7-bd50-4754a418c60f_1280x1280.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h1><span>The Big Picture</span></h1><p><span>Every September, politicians celebrate the workers who built America&#8217;s middle class. Michigan is attempting something more ambitious: </span><em><strong><span>rebuilding some of the institutions that helped workers build it.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>For decades, that project appeared to be moving in the opposite direction but </span><em><strong><span>Michigan is leading the charge to change that momentum.</span></strong></em></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.blue-laboratories.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading Blue Laboratories! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>Michigan was once nearly synonymous with American organized labor. The sit-down strikes in Flint helped build the United Auto Workers. Detroit&#8217;s automakers helped turn collective bargaining into a vehicle for middle-class wages and benefits. At the end of the 1980s, more than one in four Michigan workers belonged to a union.</span></p><p><span>Then came decades of decline. By 2012, Michigan&#8217;s union membership rate had fallen to 16.6%. That same year, </span><em><strong><span>Republicans delivered another blow: making the birthplace of the modern American labor movement a right-to-work state.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>Eleven years later, Democrats got the chance to reverse it.</span></p><p><span>After winning full control of state government for the first time in roughly four decades, Democrats and Governor Gretchen Whitmer repealed right-to-work. The change took effect in February 2024, making Michigan the first state in nearly six decades to repeal such a law. It was an extraordinary reversal of a conservative policy project that, for decades, had moved almost exclusively in one direction &#8211; But reversing a law is easier than reversing its effects.</span></p><p><span>Two years into Michigan&#8217;s experiment, union membership has not surged as some had hoped and even remains near historic lows. That doesn&#8217;t necessarily mean repeal failed, but it does suggest something more important about </span><em><strong><span>what government can&#8212;and cannot&#8212;do to rebuild worker power.</span></strong></em></p><h1><span>How Michigan Lost the Union State</span></h1><p><span>It&#8217;s important to establish at the outset that Right-to-work didn&#8217;t destroy Michigan&#8217;s unions.</span></p><p><span>Michigan&#8217;s union decline began long before Republicans enacted the law in 2012. In 1989, 26% of Michigan wage-and-salary workers belonged to a union. By 2004, it was 21.6%. By 2012, it was 16.6%. Right-to-work arrived in the middle of that decline.</span></p><p><span>The policy itself is also frequently misunderstood.</span></p><p><span>Under federal labor law, a union chosen to represent a workplace generally has an obligation to represent workers covered by the bargaining unit. Right-to-work laws prevent unions and employers from negotiating agreements requiring represented workers to financially support that representation.</span></p><ul><li><p><span>Supporters call that worker choice: no employee should have to financially support a union he or she doesn&#8217;t want to support.</span></p></li></ul><ul><li><p><span>Unions call it a free-rider problem: workers can benefit from collectively negotiated wages, benefits and representation without contributing toward the organization paying to negotiate and enforce them.</span></p></li></ul><p><span>Whatever terminology you prefer, research suggests the policy matters.</span></p><p><span>One study examining five states that adopted right-to-work laws between 2011 and 2017&#8212;including Michigan&#8212;estimated that unionization was about four percentage points lower five years after adoption, while wages were about 1% lower. The effects were particularly pronounced in industries that began with relatively high unionization.</span></p><p><span>All that to say that right-to-work didn&#8217;t create Michigan&#8217;s labor problem; however, there is evidence that it made an existing problem worse.</span></p><h1><span>Turning the Ratchet Backward</span></h1><p><span>For decades, right-to-work offered a case study in how conservatives used state government.</span></p><p><span>The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act allowed states to enact the laws. Many Southern and Western states did. Then another wave reached traditionally union-heavy parts of the Midwest. Indiana enacted right-to-work in 2012. Michigan followed. Wisconsin adopted it in 2015. West Virginia followed in 2016.</span></p><p><span>The political ratchet largely moved one way &#8211; but Michigan eventually demonstrated that it didn&#8217;t have to.</span></p><p><span>Democrats won control of both chambers of the Michigan Legislature in 2022, giving the party a governing trifecta. In March 2023, Whitmer signed legislation repealing right-to-work. The repeal took effect on February 13, 2024.</span></p><p><span>For private-sector workplaces, unions and employers could once again negotiate union-security provisions requiring workers represented by the union to financially support that representation. The change did not recreate the same system for public employees, where the U.S. Supreme Court&#8217;s </span><em><span>Janus</span></em><span> decision prohibits compulsory agency fees.</span></p><p><span>The broader significance, however, went beyond the technical change. Michigan became the first state in 58 years to repeal right-to-work. </span><em><strong><span>That&#8217;s an important lesson for Democrats interested in state policy: policy regimes aren&#8217;t permanent &#8211; states can be laboratories for reversing policy experiments too!</span></strong></em></p><p><span>But that leaves the harder question &#8211; did it work?</span></p><h1><span>So, Did It Work?</span></h1><p><span>The first year looked promising.</span></p><p><span>Michigan entered 2024 with its union membership rate at 12.8%&#8212;the lowest level recorded since comparable state data began in 1989. Then right-to-work repeal took effect. By the end of the year, Michigan had approximately 581,000 union members, up from 564,000. Union density climbed from 12.8% to 13.4%.</span></p><p><span>It would have made for a tidy story: Michigan repealed right-to-work. Union membership went up.</span></p><p><span>Then came 2025 where Michigan&#8217;s union membership fell back to approximately 566,000. Union density slipped to 13%. In other words, two years into the post-right-to-work experiment, Michigan has roughly as many union members as it did before repeal.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Those numbers require some caution.</span></strong></em><span> State-level union estimates come from relatively small survey samples, and federal statisticians warn against reading too much into small year-to-year changes. The 2025 figures are additionally based on only 11 months because October data weren&#8217;t collected during the federal government shutdown.</span></p><p><span>But inconvenient data shouldn&#8217;t simply be explained away. There is no evidence yet of the dramatic union revival that supporters might have hoped would follow repeal.</span></p><p><span>The more interesting question is whether we should have expected one.</span></p><h1><span>What Government Can&#8212;and Can&#8217;t&#8212;Do</span></h1><p><span>Repealing right-to-work doesn&#8217;t organize a single workplace.</span></p><p><span>It doesn&#8217;t convince workers at a nonunion factory that they should organize. It doesn&#8217;t win a representation election. It doesn&#8217;t force an employer to agree to a first contract. And it certainly doesn&#8217;t reverse decades of automation, deindustrialization, globalization and changes in the composition of the American workforce.</span></p><p><span>What repeal does is change the institutional environment in which unions operate.</span></p><p><span>A union that represents a bargaining unit must expend resources negotiating contracts, handling grievances and representing workers. Right-to-work allowed workers receiving those services to opt out of financially supporting the union.</span></p><p><span>Michigan has now removed that restriction for private-sector collective bargaining.</span></p><p><span>That can potentially give unions more reliable resources to service existing members and organize new ones. But there is an important distinction:</span><em><span> </span><strong><span>strengthening the infrastructure of organized labor is not the same thing as expanding organized labor.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>Michigan can make it easier for unions to build. Unions still have to build.</span></p><p><span>And because collective-bargaining agreements operate on multiyear cycles, the practical consequences of repeal won&#8217;t arrive everywhere simultaneously. Union-security provisions may have to be negotiated as contracts expire.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>That makes Michigan&#8217;s experiment less like flipping a switch and more like resetting a machine that has been moving in the opposite direction for decades.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>The real test isn&#8217;t simply whether Michigan&#8217;s union density moved from 12.8% to 13.4% and then 13%. It&#8217;s what happens next.</span></p><h1><span>The Case Against</span></h1><p><span>There is another reason not to judge Michigan solely by its union membership numbers. Opponents made a different prediction &#8211; they argued repeal would hurt Michigan&#8217;s economy.</span></p><p><span>The U.S. Chamber of Commerce warned lawmakers in 2023 that right-to-work helped Michigan compete for economic-development projects and jobs. If businesses were choosing between otherwise similar sites, the Chamber argued, right-to-work could tilt investment toward Michigan.</span></p><p><span>The philosophical argument was equally straightforward: workers should decide for themselves whether a union provides enough value to deserve their financial support. Those aren&#8217;t totally frivolous objections.</span></p><p><span>If stronger unions produce higher labor costs, businesses deciding where to build their next factory may take those costs into account. Michigan isn&#8217;t competing only against Ohio or Illinois. It is competing for manufacturing investment against states across the South where unionization is much lower.</span></p><p><span>That gives Michigan&#8217;s experiment two potential measures of failure.</span></p><ol><li><p><span>Repeal could fail because it doesn&#8217;t meaningfully strengthen organized labor</span></p></li></ol><blockquote><p><span>or</span></p></blockquote><ol start="2"><li><p><span>It could strengthen labor while making Michigan substantially less competitive for investment and jobs.</span></p></li></ol><p><em><strong><span>So far, neither conclusion is obvious. </span></strong></em><span>There hasn&#8217;t been a dramatic union resurgence. But there also isn&#8217;t compelling evidence that ending right-to-work has produced the economic calamity opponents warned about.</span></p><p><span>That leaves Michigan in a much more interesting place than either side&#8217;s talking points suggest.</span></p><h1><span>The Michigan Test</span></h1><p><span>The next several years should tell us much more. Ultimately, Michigan&#8217;s right-to-work repeal experiment should be judged by three tests.</span></p><ol><li><p><strong><span>Institutional strength</span></strong><span> - Do Michigan unions become financially and organizationally stronger as collective-bargaining agreements turn over and the repeal works its way through unionized workplaces?</span></p></li><li><p><strong><span>Organizing strength</span></strong><span> - Do those stronger institutions translate their resources into organizing campaigns, election victories and first contracts that actually bring more workers into organized labor?</span></p></li><li><p><strong><span>Worker outcomes</span></strong><span> - Does stronger collective bargaining translate into higher compensation, better benefits and greater economic security without imposing an economic cost large enough to outweigh those gains?</span></p></li></ol><p><span>These tests matter because Michigan&#8217;s experiment speaks to something larger than right-to-work.</span></p><p><span>Democrats have spent much of the past decade searching for ways to rebuild their economic relationship with working-class voters. Much of that agenda asks government to do more for workers: subsidize child care, lower health-care costs, provide paid leave, forgive debt or send tax credits.</span></p><p><span>Those policies can materially improve people&#8217;s lives.</span></p><p><span>But Labor policy operates differently. Its underlying proposition is that government doesn&#8217;t have to negotiate every economic gain on workers&#8217; behalf. It can instead </span><em><strong><span>change the rules governing the workplace and give workers more power to negotiate those gains themselves.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>Michigan is testing how far that proposition can go.</span></p><h1><span>Bottom Line</span></h1><p><span>There is an appealing simplicity to Michigan&#8217;s right-to-work repeal.</span></p><p><span>Republicans passed a law designed to limit unions. Democrats took power and repealed it. Organized labor gets stronger. </span><em><strong><span>Reality is proving more complicated.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>Michigan&#8217;s labor movement was declining long before right-to-work arrived. Repealing one law was never going to reverse decades of economic and institutional change overnight. </span><em><strong><span>But that doesn&#8217;t make the repeal meaningless.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>Michigan has removed a policy that research suggests contributed to lower unionization and wages. It has demonstrated that the conservative state-policy ratchet can run backward. And it has given organized labor a more favorable set of rules under which to rebuild.</span></p><p><span>What it hasn&#8217;t done is rebuild labor for them. That may ultimately be the most useful lesson from Michigan&#8217;s experiment.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Government can change the rules of the game. But Labor has to prove it can win under them.</span></strong></em></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.blue-laboratories.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading Blue Laboratories! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Vermont Made Child Care Affordable. Making It Available Is Harder.]]></title><description><![CDATA[Act 76 offers Democrats a credible state model for financing child care&#8212;and a warning about confusing subsidies with supply.]]></description><link>https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/vermont-made-child-care-affordable</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.blue-laboratories.com/p/vermont-made-child-care-affordable</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Jordan]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 14:58:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong><span>Big Picture</span></strong></h2><p><span>When Vermont lawmakers enacted Act 76 in 2023, they did more than enlarge a subsidy program. They made a bet about what child-care policy should become.</span></p><p><span>Instead of treating assistance as a narrowly targeted benefit for poor families, </span><em><strong><span>Vermont extended help deep into the middle class</span></strong></em><span>. Instead of asking providers to absorb the difference between what parents could pay and what care cost to deliver, </span><em><strong><span>the state increased reimbursement rates</span></strong></em><span>. And instead of financing the expansion through temporary federal aid or an annual budget scramble, </span><em><strong><span>lawmakers imposed a dedicated 0.44% payroll contribution.</span></strong></em></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.blue-laboratories.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading Blue Laboratories! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p><span>Three years later, the early result is neither the universal success story advocates sometimes describe nor the tax-heavy cautionary tale opponents predicted. </span><em><strong><span>Vermont has made child care substantially more affordable for thousands of families and has begun to stabilize a shrinking provider market.</span></strong></em><span> But it still cannot produce enough workers and slots&#8212;especially for infants, toddlers, and families in thin rural markets.</span></p><p><span>That mixed result is precisely what makes Vermont&#8217;s policy approach to child care particularly valuable for other states looking to address the child care crisis. </span><em><strong><span>Act 76 is a blueprint for how states can begin building a child-care system - it is also a warning that financing demand is faster than building supply.</span></strong></em></p><h2><strong><span>Vermont&#8217;s Market was Broken</span></strong></h2><p><span>Child care has an unusual economic problem. It is too expensive for many families and still too cheap to support the wages necessary to retain workers. Providers cannot solve that contradiction by becoming more efficient: caring for infants and toddlers requires a high ratio of adults to children.</span></p><p><span>Vermont&#8217;s pre-reform data showed the damage. Between 2012 and 2023, the number of home-based providers fell nearly 60%. Statewide infant capacity declined 10% and toddler capacity 19%. By 2023, Vermont had fewer than 40 licensed slots for every 100 infants. Child-care workers earned roughly 55% of the average Vermont worker&#8217;s pay, and turnover exceeded the rate across the state economy.</span></p><p><span>The politics developed over more than a decade. Advocates framed child care as workforce infrastructure&#8212;something that allowed parents to work and employers to hire&#8212;while earlier legislation funded studies and incremental improvements. In 2023, the Democratic-led legislature passed H.217 over Republican Gov. Phil Scott&#8217;s veto. Scott agreed that child care needed investment but opposed the payroll tax and scale of spending.</span></p><p><span>That disagreement clarified the choice. A cheaper program could serve fewer families or pay providers less. Vermont chose a broad, durable system and attached a visible tax to it.</span></p><h2><strong><span>What Does Act 75 Do?</span></strong></h2><p><span>Act 76 expands eligibility for the Child Care Financial Assistance Program to</span><em><strong><span> 575% of the federal poverty level, bringing substantial portions of the middle class into the program</span></strong></em><span>. Families at or below 175% of poverty have no family payment; assistance then phases down as income rises.</span></p><p><span>On the supply side, Vermont </span><em><strong><span>raised provider reimbursements by 35%</span></strong></em><span>, stopped tying state payments to a provider&#8217;s lower private rate, and later narrowed the gap between payments to home-based and center-based programs. It also </span><em><strong><span>financed readiness, quality, and capacity grants.</span></strong></em></p><p><em><strong><span>The sequencing mattered.</span></strong></em><span> Stabilization grants and higher provider rates arrived before the final eligibility expansion in October 2024. In theory, that gave programs time to raise pay, hire, or reopen classrooms before subsidized demand peaked. The dedicated Child Care Contribution took effect in July 2024. The assessment equals 0.44% of covered payroll; employers can pass no more than one-quarter of it&#8212;0.11%&#8212;to employees. Through November 2025, it had collected about $99.6 million.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png" width="1198" height="612" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:612,&quot;width&quot;:1198,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!pKCH!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4e72475d-331b-488b-855b-7af34707eae5_1198x612.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><em><strong><span>Ironically, the tax is both the policy&#8217;s political vulnerability and one of its chief strengths.</span></strong></em><span> Earmarked revenue is harder to quietly repurpose and gives providers more confidence that higher rates will last. But payroll taxes can modestly reduce compensation or hiring over time, even when employers formally pay them. States should acknowledge that cost rather than pretending the funding is free.</span></p><h2><strong><span>Key Policy Takeaway - Affordability Moved First</span></strong></h2><p><em><strong><span>The clearest outcome is participation.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>Child Trends found that families receiving subsidies increased 48%, from 5,389 in July 2023 to 7,983 in April 2025. State monitoring shows children enrolled in CCFAP rising from 7,533 in June 2023 to 12,234 in September 2025.</span></p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l6oG!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l6oG!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l6oG!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l6oG!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l6oG!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l6oG!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png" width="1180" height="612" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:612,&quot;width&quot;:1180,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l6oG!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l6oG!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l6oG!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!l6oG!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1448821c-cc54-4dfd-a802-77bbc090a9e2_1180x612.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p><span>That does not prove every new enrollee obtained a new slot; some families were already paying privately and became eligible for help.</span><em><strong><span> But it does show that Vermont successfully reached beyond the traditional low-income subsidy population.</span></strong></em><span> For those families, the program converts a large, volatile household bill into a smaller payment tied to income.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>The provider response is real but slower. </span></strong></em><span>Child Trends found a 2.4% increase in the number of providers between November 2023 and December 2024, including a 3% rise in home-based providers. The share of providers accepting subsidies increased by 4.8 percentage points. State data show licensed programs rising from 1,045 in September 2023 to 1,072 two years later.</span></p><p><span>Those are meaningful reversals after a long contraction, but they are not yet a supply transformation. Vermont&#8217;s 2026 monitoring report still identifies workforce shortages as the largest barrier to expansion. Affordability improved more rapidly than availability, and the gaps remain greatest where care is most labor-intensive.</span></p><h2><strong><span>The Strongest Critique is About Execution, Not Intent</span></strong></h2><p><span>Act 76&#8217;s early fiscal record also calls for humility.</span></p><p><span>State economists now expect the payroll contribution to raise </span><em><strong><span>about $11 million less per year than originally projected</span></strong></em><span> because the covered tax base was smaller than estimated. The program was not facing an immediate funding crisis: Vermont projected that roughly 99% of its approximately $172 million FY2026 CCFAP budget would be spent. Still, the miss is material and should shape other states&#8217; planning.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>Administrative complexity is another constraint.</span></strong></em><span> Providers have reported friction around enrollment-based payments and the interaction of child-care subsidies with Vermont&#8217;s prekindergarten system. Meanwhile, contemplated pre-K restructuring did not proceed on its original July 2026 timetable.</span></p><p><span>There is also an evidence problem. Vermont can document enrollment, payments, providers, and licensed capacity. It cannot yet confidently attribute changes in parental employment, statewide labor supply, child outcomes, or long-term provider wages to Act 76. </span><em><strong><span>Future evaluations should resist converting plausible benefits into measured ones.</span></strong></em></p><h2><strong><span>The Blueprint for Other States</span></strong></h2><p><span>The lesson is not simply &#8220;adopt a payroll tax.&#8221; The model has five linked parts.</span></p><ol><li><p><span>Finance families and providers together. Expanding subsidies without raising provider rates can create longer queues for the same scarce slots. Raising rates without family assistance leaves care unaffordable.</span></p></li></ol><ol start="2"><li><p><span>Stabilize supply before expanding eligibility. Vermont&#8217;s sequencing was sensible, even if the runway was too short to eliminate shortages.</span></p></li></ol><ol start="3"><li><p><span>Use permanent revenue&#8212;but forecast it conservatively. A replicating state should model collections at least 10% to 15% below the central estimate and create an automatic response if revenue or enrollment diverges from projections.</span></p></li></ol><ol start="4"><li><p><span>Pay explicitly for hard-to-provide care. Infant care, nonstandard hours, rural service, and care for children with specialized needs will not emerge evenly from a general rate increase. Enhanced rates and targeted capacity grants should be designed from the beginning.</span></p></li></ol><ol start="5"><li><p><span>Measure functional capacity, not just licenses. The relevant questions are whether classrooms are staffed, whether families can find hours that match work, and whether providers can retain employees with wages and benefits&#8212;not how many slots exist on paper.</span></p></li></ol><h2><strong><span>Bottom Line</span></strong></h2><p><span>Vermont has not solved the child care crisis entirely but it has done something instructive: it has shown that </span><em><strong><span>a state can rapidly remove price barriers and interrupt provider decline, while revealing where cash alone stops working.</span></strong></em></p><p><span>For Democrats looking for a governing model, Act 76 is worth adapting.</span></p><p><em><strong><span>But the honest promise is not instant universality &#8211; it is a durable public system built in the right order&#8212;and judged by whether a parent can actually find care.</span></strong></em></p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.blue-laboratories.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading Blue Laboratories! 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